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900
View Dnve Suite
Post Office Box 51505
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone (208) 522-6700
Facsimile (208)
111
rbb@rnoffatt.com
kde@moffatt.com
1
for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE

OF IDAHO,

FOR

CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company
Plaintiffs,
vs.
TETON COlJNTY, a political subdivision of
the State ofidaho,

VERIFIED COMPLAiNT FOR:
(i) DECLARATORY JUDGMENT,
(ii) BREACH OF CONTRACT AND
RESCISSION, (iii) UNJUST
ENRICHMENT
Fee Category: A
Fee: $96.00

Defendant.

Plaintiffs Burns Concrete, foe. and Burns Holdings, LLC (jointly, "Bums" or
"Developer"), as their complaint in this
follows:

against Defendant Teton County, allege as

5,

2.

as

9

true and correct copy of the recorded Agreement is attached hereto as

Exhibit l and incorporated herein by reference.
3.

Bums now seeks (a) a decree that Teton County is estopped from rezoning

property described m the Agreement and that the time for constructing the "Pennanent
Facility" defined in the Agreement has been tolled since November 15,

, when the Teton

Board of County Commissioners first voted to deny issuance of the land use approvals
required

construction of the Pennanent F ac11ity; (b) a decree establishing Teton County's
repudiation and material breach and Burns'

judgment against Teton

for all damages incurred

the
Bums

-""''-""" together
to or arising out

of the Agreen1ent; and (c) in the event the Agreement should be held to be void or voidable by
County, judgment agamst Teton County for restitution damages in an amount equal to the
benefits by which Teton County was unjustly enriched as a result

the public improvements

constructed by Burns pursuant to the terms of the Agreement.
PARTIES
4.

Burns Concrete, Inc. is an Idaho corporation engaged in the manufacture

and sale of concrete, and Burns Holdings, LLC is an Idaho limited liability company engaged in
holding

property,

two companies being

-2

common ownership and

§

8.
of the City

The real property subjected to

Agreement is located within the Area of

Dnggs, Teton County, Idaho and described in Exhibit

to the

(the "Property").
9.

Pursuant to Paragraph 1 (titled, Zoning Ordinance Amendment) of the

Agreement, Teton County agreed to "adopt an ordinance amending the Driggs Arna ofirnpact
Zoning Map to rezone the property to Ml." The Property was thereafter rezoned by Teton
to

Industrial).
10.

Pursuant to Paragraph 2 (titled,

on

The
use allowed and restrictions pursuant to this
conditional rezone as reflected this Agreement are
a.
The property shall be used exclusively for the
operation of a ready-mix concrete manufacturing plant
b.
. . . . This development and operation shall be
subject to the following terms and conditions, in addition to the
other tenns hereof:

(i)
Developer intends to operate a Ready-Mix Concrete
Manufacturing Facility (a "Facility") on the property.
(ii)
All operations on the property shall comply with all
applicable and governing local, state or US. ordinances and laws
relating to dust, noise, water quality and
quality.

's

(v)
In order to facilitate and supp01i the construction
the Pennanent Facility and to
Developer to expedite
a
commercial operations, the Developer shall erect and
temporary concrete batch plant on site as shown in Exhibit "B" Site Plan and Exhibit "D''.
(vi)
In the event that the Permanent Facility is not
completed within the time allowed herein, the County shall have
the right to revoke the authority to operate the Temporary Facility.
The grant of authority
Facility is to allow
Developer to operate Developer's business until the Permanent
is constructed. The authority to operate
Facility shall tem1inate
completion of the Pemunent
sooner
(18)
U,CJHCH

italics added.)
11.

Pursuant to Paragraph 5 (titled,

Reversion

The execution of this Agreement shall be deemed written
consent by Developer to change the zoning of the subject property
to its prior designation upon failure to comply with the conditions
imposed by this Agreement. No reversion shall take place until
a
on
matter
to
Code §67-651
Upon notice and hearing, as provided in this Agreement and in
Idaho Code §67-6509, if the property described in attached
Exhibit "A" is not used as approved, or if the approved use ends
or is abandoned, the Board of County Commissioners may, upon
receiving a recommendation from the City's governing board,
order th.at the property will revert to the.
designation (and
land uses allowed by that zoning designation) existing
HUUCv·~

to

8

its terms or -~cc,~•·•~a~,
breaching party not
in writing, unless an
exists threatening the health and
safety of the public. If such an emergency exists, written
shall be given in a reasonable time and manner in light of the
circumstances of the breach. The time of the giving of the notice
shall be measured from the date of the written Notice of Default.
The Notice of Default shall specifj1 the nature of the alleged default
and, where appropriate, the manner and period of time during
which said default may be satisfactorily cured. During any period
of curing, the party charged shall not be considered in default for
the purposes of termination or zoning reversion, or the institution
oflegal proceedings. If the default is cured, then no default shall
exist and the charging party shall take no further action.
(Italics added.)
13.

Finally, pursuant to Paragraph 12.b of the Agreement,
Property in perpetuity, and inures to the

Agreement runs
JS

by

its assigns.
GENERAJ_, ALLEGATIONS

Paragraph 2.b(iii) and Exhibit C of the Agreement expressly provide
and depict Bums' construction ofits desired 75-foot "Permanent Facility."
15.

In accordance with Teton County's requirements, the City of Driggs'

Plam1ing and Zoning Commission heard on July 11, 2007 and unanimously reco1mnended for
approval by Teton County both the Agreement and the issuance of a conditional use permit
allowing the 75-foot height of the Permanent Facility (the "CUP").
16.
into the

Thereafter, on or about August 31, 2007 Teton County and Burns
Teton County

to be recorded.

concrete
Burns to incur substantial
for prior waste disposal, clearing and grubbing the site, extending utilities to the

and

transporting to and erecting on the site the Temporary Facility; (b) constructing the road and
highway improvements required under Paragraph 2.d(iv) of the Agreement, which required
Bums to incur substantial expense for barrier fencing with concrete foundations, new turn lanes,
landscaping, and performance bonds; and (c) applying for and taking all actions necessary to
obtain the CUP and variance required to construct the Pennanent Facility.
18.
notwithstanding

After Burns had incurred

substantial costs required

Agreement,

unanimous recommendation for approval by the
the determination

Teton County's

Agreement was a valid and binding contract, the Teton County Board

that

County Commissioners

voted to deny the CUP on November 15, 2007.
19.

Burns confirmed with Teton County's director of planning

zonmg,

Kurt Hibbert, on November 20, 2007 that Teton County would not issue a building permit for the
construction of the Permanent Facility specified in the Agreement.
20.

Bums has undertaken every act reasonably possible to obtain the C1JP and

variance required by Teton County for Burns to construct the Permanent Facility, which CUP
and variance Teton

to issue.

1 through 21.

to

operations into

Burns met with representatives of both Teton County and the City of Driggs to
detennine whether and where to construct a concrete batch plant in the area. All such
representatives encouraged Burns to construct such a plant, with both Teton County and the City
Driggs designating the Property as the specific site where Burns should construct it.
Bums purchased the Property based on
and

County and the

representations made

the reasonable expectancy

into the
to

a

Bums has operated and continues to operate
accordance

terms of

Agreement.

able to construct the Pennanent

reason

Teton

Temporary

111

Bums cannot now and has not ever
actions and ·

over

which Bums has 110 control.
26.

Neve1iheless, by letter dated October 23, 2012 from the Teton County

Prosecuting Attorney, Teton County resubmitted to the City ofDnggs a previously
application

a recommendation by the city that the zoning of the Property should revert to C3

(Service and Highway Commercial). Although a final decision on the application was tabled by
'Planning
to rezone

Property remams

l

s

to
paragraph 17, it

be unconscionable to permit Teton County to rezone the ,.,,,.,,,",,,_" to C3

Teton County should thus be estopped from doing so,
28.

Additionally, by letter dated November 5, 2012 from the Teton County

Prosecuting Attorney to Bums' counsel, Teton County asserted that the clause in Paragraph
of the Agreement extending the 18-month period to construct the Pennanent Facility "is
the

inapplicable to the present situation" and threatened to file suit to force Bums'
Temporary Facility from the Property.
By reason of Teton
to file suit to

efforts to rezone the

removal of the Temporary Facility, an actual

between Burns and Teton County

its

existing

with respect to whether (a) Teton County should

estopped from rezonrng the Property for so long as Burns is not in material breach
Agreement and (b) whether the time for constructing the Penn anent Facility

the

been tolled since

November 15, 2007, when the Teton County Board of County Commissioners first voted to deny
issuance of

CUP required for the construction of the Penn anent Facility, or such other date as

the Court may detennine to be applicable.
30.
respective rights

Pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 10-1201 and J 0-1203, a determination of the
to

Burns and Teton
to

lS

to

1S

construct
to

Pe1manent

COUNT II
(Breach of Contract and Rescission)
31.

Bums hereby incorporates
By letter dated October

removal

paragraphs 1 through 30.
2012 from its Board of County Commissioners,

Property.
to

s

and demand,
15,

constituted a breach of

2

Agreement and demanded the following:

the County contends the Developer has breached or is in
default of the Agreement, that the County provide the Developer
of Default, in writing
"not
thirty (30) days
... [and] specify the nature of the alleged default and,
appropriate, the manner and period of time during which said
default may be satisfactorily cured" in accordance with the
requirements imposed under Paragraph 8 of the Agreement;
(ii)
no further
to
Developer's
under the Agreement without first providing a
written Notice of Default and opp01iunity to cure the alleged
default - as is expressly reqmred by Paragraph 8 the Agreement;
and
(iii)

That the County provide
of its notice

Burns
s

to rezone

as

5,2012

26,

the Teton County Prosecuting

(b)

to Bums' counsel, rej

all

demands made by Burns and threatening to file suit to compel Bums' removal
the Prope1iy.

Temporary Facility

By undertaking the action alleged in above paragraph 34, Teton County
repudiated

c:.ca,v,,0

under and materially breached the Agreement.

therefore seeks judgment rescinding the Agreement and awarding

36.

the damages it incurred as a result of its reasonable expectations of entering into
on

under the Agreement, m

amount to

at

COUNT III
(Unjust Enrichment)
1 through

38.

Bums' construction of the road and highway improvements alleged in

above paragraph 17 conferred a benefit upon Teton County that would be inequitable for it to
without payment.
Accordingly, in the event the Agreement should be held to be void or
voidable by Teton
to

at

seeks judgment awarding it restitution damages, in

amount

costs.

Burns prays for judgment as follows:
1.

for a decree enjoining Teton County from rezoning the Property for so

as Bums is not in material breach of the Agreement;
2.

for a decree establishing that

18-month period to construct

Facility specified in the Agreement has been and remains tolled;
3.

for a decree establishing Teton County's material breach and

of the Agreement, together with an award
4.

damages Bums

incuued;

held to be

m the event the

an

ofrestitution
5.

mcluding reasonable

incuued by Burns;
6.

for such other and additional

DATED this

as may be just

-1{

7 - day of May 2013.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

fees,

)

duly sworn, deposes

in the above-entitled proceeding, and
the
limited liability company named the above-entitled proceeding, and is authorized to make
verification in their behalf.
COMPLAINT, knows the contents
He has read the foregoing
thereof, and the same are true to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
(\

_jQ_ day of May,

13.

2007-09-05
No.
Recorded for: BURNS CONCRET
MARY LOU HANSEN
Ex-Officio Recorder Deputy

Pages:

!nde-:r to. AGREEMENT

,-r

On the~ day of ---/\ u----;::\
, 2007, Teton County, Idaho (hereinafter
referred to as "County"), and ~ms Holdings, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company
(hereinafter referred to as "Developer"), the owner of the real property described in the
attached E~hibit nA 11 enter into the following agreement:
'-4-

\VHEREAS, the Developer has applied for a zone change from C3, Service and
Highway Commercial to M 1, Light Industrial, for certain real property described in
Exhibit II N', attached hereto and located in the City of Driggs Area of Impact, Teton
County Idaho, and hereinafter referred to as "the property"; and
WHEREAS, the Developer has requested the zone change for the purpose of
developing a concrete batch plant facility on the property; and
WHEREAS, the County, pursuant to Section 67 -6511 A, Idaho Code, has the
and to enter into a development agreement for
authority to conditionally rezone
purpose of allowing, by agreement, a specific development to proceed in a specific area
and for a specific purpose or use which is appropriate in the area, but for which all allowed
uses for L11e requested zoning may not be appropriate pursuant to the Idaho Code and the
City of Driggs Zoning Ordinance, adopted by the County as the official zoning ordinance
for the Driggs Area 1mpact; and
\VHEREAS, the County and the Developer desire to formalize and clarify the
respective obligations of the parties, it is agreed as follows:
1.
Zoning Ordinance Amendment: The City of Driggs (hereinafter referred to as
"City")
recommended approval of, and the County hereby grants, the zone change to M
1, Light Industrial, for the property, and will adopt an ordinance amending the Driggs Area
of Impact Zoning Map to rezone the property to Ml.
2.
Conditions on Development: The sole use allowed and restrictions pursuant to
this conditional rezone as reflected in this Agreement are as follows:
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a.
concrete manufacturing facility.

shall

a

b.
At the current cirne the property has been re-zoned to M 1, Light
as described in paragraph 1. above. Part of such approval and recommendation
was based upon execution of this development agreement to identify responsibilities and
obligations pertaining to certain matters relating to the improvement and operation of the
property. This development .and operation shall be subject to the following terms and
conditions, in addition to the other terms hereof:
(i)
Developer intends to operate
Manufacturing Facility (a "Facility") on the property.

a

Ready-Mix

Concrete

(ii)
All operations on the property shall comply with all applicable
and
local, state or U.S. ordinances and laws relating to dust,
water quality
and air quality.
as
" - Site Plan, and
Building Elevations, and
this reference incorporated herein are plans
of
Developer's intended permanent facility ("Permanent Facility

Immediately upon execution of this Agreement, Developer shall
order and commence construction of the Permanent Facility. The installation of the
Permanent Faciliry shall
completed within eighteen (18) months
execution of this
Agreement by the County, subject to delays resulting from weather, strikes, shortage of
steel or manufacturing equipment or any other act of force majeure or action beyond
Developer's control.
(v)
In order to facilitate and support the construction of the
Permanent Facility and to allow the Developer to expedite commercial operations, the
Developer shall erect and operate a temporary concrete batch plant on site as sho\,vn in
Exhibit ;, B" Site Plan and Exhibit "D".
(vi)

2

In the event that the Permanent Facility is not completed within
Counry shall have the right to
to operate
The
of aurhority
Temporary
is to allov,,
The
Burns

'l
lj

shall
Facility even if sooner than che described eighteen (18) month time
The access to the property from State Highway 33 shall be via Casper
, which shall be improved to City of Driggs Public Works Standards and
Specifications, as shown in the construction drawings submitted by Developer and held by
City of Driggs, prior to operation of the Temporary Facility.
c.

d.
To assure compatibility with other surrounding uses the following
matters have been addressed and agreed upon for the Permanent Facility as
follows:
(i)
related issues will be addressed by construction of
concrete block
eight and three-quarters feet . 75 ') in height along
the property, as shown tn Exhibit B - Site Plan and enclosure
the
a
as
m
C
(ii)
Dust will be controlled through paving of the area around the
enclosure of the Batch Plant Equipment within a building, a truck wash for
trucks utilized by the Facility and a dust collection system on the Batch Plant. In addition,
the Facility will have an air quality permit from the Idaho Department of Environmental
· and comply with the requirements

(iii)

Hours of operation shall not be restricted as this 1s consistent

with the provisions for M 1 and C3 zoning. The property is surrounded by property zoned

M 1 and C3. The construction business activities of the Facility sometimes require varying
hours of operation due to the nature of the construction industry.
(iv)
Traffic issues shall be mitigated by construction of
improvements on Casper Drive as described herein and the implementation of
improvements on Highway 33 as required by the Idaho Department of Transportation.
(v)

wall

of

Landscaping on the
will
(1

of a block
The east boundary of the

t]

if the future
planned
- Block Wall Planter Detaii.

area 1s

(vi) Lighting issues shall be mitigated by using cut-off fixtures that
direct the light downward rather than flood lighting.
3.
Indemnity: Developer agrees to, and does hereby, defend, hold harmless and
indemnify the City and County, all associated elected and appointed officials, officers,
employees, agents, representatives, and attorneys, from any and all claims that may, at any
time, be asserted against any such parties in connection with:
a.
the City's or County's review and approval of any plans or
improvements, or the issuance
any approvals, permits, certificates, or
relating to the use andior development
the property;
b.

the
related ordinances,
c.

maintenance of

the
County of
, or other

property;

obligations under this
; and

d.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the indemnification terms of this
paragraph 3 shall not extend or apply to the failure of the County to follow, in good faith,
law or ordinances.
4.
: This Agreement may be modified onJy by a written
document, signed by the parties, or their successors in interest, after complying with the
notice and hearing procedures of Idaho Code §67-6509 and of the Driggs Zoning
Ordinance.

5.
: The execution of this Agreement shall
written consent by Developer to change the zoning of the subject property to its prior
designation upon failure to comply with the conditions imposed by this Agreement. No
reversion shall take place until after a hearing on this matter pursuant to Idaho Code §67l lA. Upon
. as
ided in ·
and in Idaho Code §67property described in attached
, or if
or is

a recommendation
City's governing board,
that the
·l
revert to the zoning designation (and iand uses aiiowed by that zoning designation) existing
immediately prior to the rezone action, i.e., the property shall revert back to rhe C3,
Service and Highway Commercial zoning designation.
6.
· The County may, while this Agreement is in effect, annually
review the extent of good faith substantial compliance with the tem1s of this Agreement.
Developer shall have the duty to demonstrate Developer's good faith compliance with the
terms of this Agreement during such review.
7.
· Developer shall comply with all commitments set out in this
Agreement. Developer shall timely and satisfactorily carry out al1 required performance to
appropriately maintain, in the discretion of the County, all commitments set forth in this
Agreement.
8.
· In the event of a default or breach of this Agreement
or
its terms or conditions, the party
default shall
the breaching party
not
than thirty (30) days Notice of Default,
writing, unless an emergency exists
threatening the health and safety of the public. If such an emergency exists, written notice
shall be given in a reasonable time and manner in light of the circumstances of the breach.
The time of the giving of
notice shall be measured from the date of the written Notice of
Default. The Notice of Default shall specify the nature of the alleged default and, where
appropriate, the manner and period of time during which said default may be satisfactorily
cured. During any period of curing, the party charged shall not be considered in default for
the purposes of termination or zoning reversion, or the institution of legal proceedings. If
the default is cured, then no default shall exist and the charging party shall take no further
action.
9.
Termination: This Agreement may be terminated in accordance with
notice
and hearing procedures ofidaho Code §67-6509, and the zoning designation upon which the
use is based reversed, upon failure of Developer, a subsequent owner, or other person
acquiring an interest in the property described in attached Exhibit "A" to comply with the
terms
this Agreement.

: Burns

Zone
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's

to

Developer to an
jurisdiction.
11.
: Any reference to laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, or
resolutions shall include such iaws, ordinances, rules, regulations, or resolutions as have
been, to the date of this agreement, or as they may then be in force in the future with
respect to proposed amendments to this Agreement in the future.
12.

a.
The parties agree that the relationship created by the agreement is
solely that
a private Developer and the City. Nothing in this agreement shall create the
Developer or City as an agent, employer, employee, legal representative, partner or
subsidiary of the other.
b.
The
that
shall run with the land and bind
be enforceable by the
in perpetuity, and shall iimre to the benefit
any of their respective legal representatives, heirs, successors, and
c.
All notice must be in writing, mailed in the U.S. Mail
to the addresses indicated on this agreement.

certified mail

d.
This agreement shall be construed and enforced pursuant to the laws of
the State of Idaho.
e.
If any party shall bring suit against the other party to enforce this
agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs.

f.
If any term of this agreement is declared invalid, illegal or
unenforceable, the remainder of this agreement shall remain operative and binding.

correction

g.
The Developer hereby guarantees the prompt and
all defects or deficiencies in the improvements that occur or

period
or
lJ

defect
ten days after written
from the City. The Developer
proceed w1th reasonable diligence to correct the defect or deficiency.
guaranty
shall be extended one full year from the date of repair or replacement of any improvement
made pursuant to this paragraph.
h.
This agreement shall be signed in duplicate originals. Each party shall
receive one original of this agreement.

i.
The County shall have this agreement recorded in the office of the
Teton County Clerk.
AGREED:
Teton County, Idaho

P.O. Box
Driggs, Idaho 83422
I

(?

1/

By:~k~~
Courtjycjerk

Developer:
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC

7 .

of

Bums

L.L.C. Zone

l]

FROl\:I INSTRUMENT NO. 183802
TRACT l : FEE EST ATE
LOT lB-W, TETON PEAKS VIEW SUBDIVISION, TETON COUNTY, IDAHO, PART
OF THE \Vl/2.NEI/4, SECTION 23, TOWNSHIP 5 NORTH, RANGE45 EAST, BOISE
MERJDIAN, TETON COUNTY, IDAHO, BEING FURTHER DESCRIBED AS: FROM
THE Nl/4 CORNER OF SAID SECTION 23, SOUTH 975.63
AND EAST, 627.41
FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING; THENCE SOUTH 510.00
TO A POINT;
WEST 274.41 FEET TO A POINT; THENCE NORTH 510.00
TO A
TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.
POINT; THENCE EAST 274.41
j,
£,.

\VITH A
UTILITY
ALONG
SOUTH SIDE OF
REMAINDER LOT
, AS SHOWN ON THE RECORD
SURVEY RECORDED FEBRUARY 24, 1999 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 133115,
RECORDS OF TETON COUNTY, IDAHO.
INSTRlJl'v!ENT NO. 183803
LOT
TETON PEAKS VIE\V SUBDIVISION, TETON COUNTY, IDAHO, BEING
FURTHER DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: PART OF THE Wl/2NE1/4 SECTION 23,
TO\VNSHIP 5 NORTH, RANGE 45 EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN, TETON COUNTY,
IDAHO, BEING FURTHER DESCRIBED AS: FROM THE Nl/4 CORNER OF SAID
AND
.41 FEET TO
POINT OF
, SOUTH 975.63
BEGINNING. THENCE EAST 274.60 FEET TO A POINT; THENCE SOUTH 510.00
FEET TO A POINT; THENCE WEST 274.60 FEET TO A POINT; THENCE NORTH
TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.
510.00
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Exhibit B
Bums Holdings Driggs Site Plan
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ANDFOR

BURNS CONCRETE, INC., AN IDAHO
AND BURNS HOLDINGS,

Plaintiff,

CaseNo.

CV-1

165

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM

v.

Defendant.

By and through counsel
as an

to

record, Defendant Teton County, Idaho submits
s

"Complaint").

answenng

this Complaint, Defendant expressly reserves, in addition to the defenses set forth below,
defenses provided for or authorized by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and all
Moreover, Defendant states

defenses provided by
as

their investigation

L

to

which an answer is

extent an answer is

a document entitled

s Agreement for

Instrument #191250 on September

admits that

Holdings,

was recorded as

2007 in Teton County at the request of Burns

Concrete.
2.

Admitted.

3.

Paragraph 3 does not contain factual allegations to which an answer 1s

required.

so

as there are any factual allegations in Paragraph

Defendant denies

the same.

to
4.

Defendant

that Burns

is an Idaho

Burns Holdings, LLC is an Idaho

Compa11~y.

knowledge or information sufficient to

a

1s without

as to the relationship between the

two companies.
5.

Defendant admits that it is a political subdivision of the State ofldaho.
to Jurisdiction

6.

Admitted.

7.

Admitted.
to

8.

Venue

1 to

10.

11.

The document attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs Complaint speaks for

itself, and no response is required.
12.

The document attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs Complaint speaks for

itself, and no response is required.
13.

The document attached as Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs Complaint speaks for

and no

is required.

to
14.

Allegations

1 to

attached as

s

for

itself, and no response is required.
15.

Admitted.

16.

Admitted that the

was entered into and it is recorded in the

office of the Teton County Clerk.
17.

Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief

as to the allegations

this Paragraph and therefore denies the allegations in this

Paragraph.
] 8.

Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief

as to what costs were

that the Teton
to

on

5,

Board

any

as to

and denied that he
enforceability
subject

the Agreement

opinion at

as to the validity or

relation to the conditional use permit which was the

the November 15, 2007 hearing.
19.

Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief

as to the allegations

this Paragraph and therefore denies the allegations in this

Paragraph.
20.
as to

Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
has undertaken

act reasonably possible to obtain the CUP and
admits that

a CUP in

21.
zone

their

that Burns cannot construct a

for a

foot

was denied
years

building in the M-1

in the Driggs' Area of Impact without an amendment to the ordinances

Teton County. Denied that Burns has no control over such amendment.
to Count
22.
21 of

Defendant hereby incorporates by reference its responses to Paragraphs 1-

Complaint herein, as if set forth in full.

Defendant is without knowledge or information
the

as to the allegations in this Paragraph and therefore

this

Paragraph.
The statements in paragraph 25 are conclusions of law and not factual
allegations and therefore no answer is required.

In so far as there are any factual

allegations in Paragraph 25, Defendant denies the same.

26.

Admitted.

27.

The statements in paragraph 27 are conclusions of law and not factual
and therefore no answer is required.
Defendant denies

28.

so far as there are

factual

same.

Admitted.
The statements in paragraph 29 are conclusions

allegations and therefore no answer is required.

not factl1al

In so far as there are any factual

allegations in Paragraph 29, Defendant denies the same.

30.
allegations

The statements in paragraph 30 are conclusions of law and not factual
therefore no answer is required.

In so far as there are any factual

allegations in Paragraph 30, Defendant denies the same.
to Count
31.

incorporates
set

m

its

to Paragraphs

35 are
allegations

therefore no answer 1s required.

and not
In so

as

are

factual

allegations in Paragraph 35, Defendant denies the same.
36.

statements in paragraph 36 are conclusions of law and not factual

allegations and therefore no answer is required.

In so far as there are any factual

allegations in Paragraph 36, Defendant denies the same.
Answers to Count

37.

of the

Defendant hereby incorporates by reference
herein, as if set forth in full.
statements

allegations
allegations
39.

to Paragraphs

paragraph 38 are

law and not factual

therefore no answer is required.

so far as there are any

Paragraph 38, Defendant denies the same.
The statements in paragraph 39 are

allegations and therefore no answer is required.

law and not factual
In so far as there are any factual

allegations in Paragraph 39, Defendant denies the same.
to Attorney Fees
40.

The statements in paragraph 40 are conclusions of law and not factual

allegations and therefore no answer 1s required.
allegations in Paragraph

Defendant

In so far as there are any factual

same.

cause

to

state a cause of action against Defendant.

Defendant alleges that by the filing of this action Complainant is pursuing a
frivolous claim that is totally and wholly without merit or justification and by reason
thereof, Defendant is entitled to its attorney fees and an award of sanctions against
Complainant and his attorney.
THIRD AFFIRJYIATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs

to bring this cause of action within five (5) years after the claim

arose or reasonable should have been discovered as

by Idaho Code§ 5-216.

Plaintiffs failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing this action

m

District

Plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages, if any.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' claims are barred, in whole or part, by the doctrine of !aches.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Teton County prays that the Court enter Judgment in

its favor and that Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, and that the Comi
grant Defendant

costs and

7

as 1s

and Burns

states and alleges as

Count I
of Contract
1.

Counterclaim Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference each and every

allegation and answer contained in the above paragraphs.
2.

Counterclaim Defendant owm approximately 6.5 acres of property m

Teton County, Idaho located at 175 N and 185N on State highway 33 (the "Property").
On February 26, 2007 Teton County granted Counterclaim Defendants

3.
application
from

a conditional zone change, altering the zoning designation on the Property
to

4.

1.

rezone

was

submitted

constructing a concrete batch plant on Bums' property located North of the City of

5.

As a condition of the rezoning the

required

written commitment (the "Agreement") concermng the use or development of the
Property.
6.

The terms of the Agreement were negotiated by and between the

Developer and the County and City planning administrators.
7.

In order to "facilitate and support

construction

Facility and to allow Developer to expedite commercial operations,"
allowed for

a

the Permanent

Facility is to allow
Permanent Facility is constructed. The authority to operate
Facility shall terminate upon completion of the Permanent
sooner than the described eighteen (18) month time period.
(Italics added.)
The Permanent Facility has never been constructed and the Temporary

9.

Facility has been in existence for over five (5) years.
10.

On April 9, 2012 Teton County provided Bums written notice

revocation of Burns Holding's authority to operate the Temporary Facility.
11.

On October 4, 2012 Teton County again provided Burns written notice of

revocation of Burns Holding's authority to operate the Temporary Facility.
12.

has refused to comply

13.

date of execution

14.

authority

to Paragraph 2(b)(iv) of the

concrete plant, the "Permanent Facility" was to be complete
from

s revocation

eighteen (18) months

the Agreement, August 31,

According to Paragraph 2(b)(iv) of the Agreement, the only matters which

could delay the eighteen (18) month completion period were those "resulting from
weather, strikes, shortage of steel or manufacturing equipment or any other act

force

majeure or actions beyond the Developer's control."
15.
act

Weather, strikes, shortage of steel, or manufacturing equipment or
force

or actions beyond
Permanent

did not cause a

1

height limitation and construct a 75-foot tall building; the County heard and ~~,, •. ~·~ the
application November 15, 2007.

18.

Counterclaim Defendants have failed to comply with the condition

the

Agreement that required it to construct the Permanent Facility within eighteen (18)
months.
19.

Counterclaim Defendants were aware of the height limitation of 45 feet in

the M-1 zone when they attached Exhibit "C"

Building Elevations - to the Agreement.

\Vhen they attached Exhibit "C" -

Building Elevations

to the

Agreement, Counterclaim Defendants were aware that in order to build a structure in
allowed 45 foot height an application was required and approval had to be

excess

obtained via statutory notice and public hearings procedures.
'11

L, 1 .

/b.en the;' attached ExI'ibit "C'~

\1

__,_ to

Building

Agreement, Counterclaim Defendants were aware that a quasi-judicial officer must
confine his or her decision to the record produced at the public hearing.
The Agreement was made for the purpose of placing conditions on the
and the Agreement did not address the 45 foot height limitation.

zone
23.
County the
of

Paragraph 5 of the Agreement, "Zoning Reversion Consent," gives
written consent of Counterclaim Defendant to rezone the property upon
condition of the

is only limited
§

the

25.

Burns contested

of Driggs Planning and

11,
Commission and

letter

April 17,

to
12 to

County Board of Commissioners. Kirk Bums also spoke in opposition to the
rezone application at

Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission public hearing on

April 11, 2012.
26.

In the minutes of the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission public

hearing on April 11, 2012 Kirk Bums is documented as stating that he knew there would
be a height issue from the beginning, but he wasn't sure of the extent until plans were
developed.
27.

resubmitted its

to make a

the

recommendation to rezone the Property and that application was heard on December 1
2012. The Driggs Commission tabled the decision
28.

By letter dated

4, 2013, Counsel

June l

13.
requested that no action

be taken on the rezone application until the court rules on the present lawsuit.
29.

Counterclaim Plaintiff, Teton County, performed all terms and conditions

required to be performed by it under the Agreement.
30.

Counterclaim Defendants breached the Agreement by failing to: (a)

comply with the County's revocation of authority for the Temporary Facility (Paragraph
(b) consent to be rezoned (Paragraph 5 of the Agreement), (c)
set forth
10 of the

7 of

Agreement);

Counterclaim Plaintiff incorporates herein

reference each and

allegation and answer contained in the above paragraphs as well as Paragraphs 1 - 31
this Counterclaim as though set forth at length.
33.

Counterclaim Plaintiff Teton County, Idaho is a political and corporate

body of the State of Idaho and is entitled to

a declaratory judgment pursuant to

Idaho Code§ 10-1213.
..,4

.)

'.

By letter dated April 17, 2012 to the Teton County Commissioners, and in

response to an April 9, 2012 letter from the Teton County Commissioners, Counterclaim
that" ...
construction
excused
35.

'obligation to commence
Facility within eighteen

was

majeure clause."
parties if an obligation

force majeure is a contract clause that

cannot be performed due to causes that are outside the control

the parties, causes

could not be avoided through the exercise of due care.
36.

the zone change hearing on February 26, 2007, the Teton County

Commissioners expressed concern that the Permanent Facility \vould be 45 feet high, and
they were told that it would look similar in
at

or substantially smaller than, the hangars

airport and that the high part of the structure would be approximately 40 feet tall.
37.

In entering the Agreement, Counterclaim
limitation

granted through a

a

risk that it
Idaho Code §

a govermng

l l(d)

to rezone

property:
If a governing board adopts a zoning classification pursuant to a request by a
property owner based upon a valid, existing comprehensive plan and zoning
ordinance, the governing board shall not subsequently reverse its action or
otherwise change the zoning classification of said property without the
consent in writing of the current property owner for a period of four (4) years
from the date the governing board adopted said individual property owner's
request for a zoning classification change. If the governing body does reverse
its action or otherwise change the zoning classification of said property
during the above four (4) year period without the current property owner's
consent in writing,
current property owner shall have standing in a court
of competent jurisdiction to enforce
provisions of this section.
Temporary
over

(5) years is in excess

41.

that has been
the

permitted in

on the subject property for
M-1 zone.

In accorda11ce ,:vith Paragraph 2(b)(\') of the De·veloper's

purpose of the Temporary Facility was to "facilitate and support the construction of the
Permanent Facility."
42.

Paragraph 5 of the Agreement, "Zoning Reversion Consent," states that

the County may rezone the property, and provides that Counterclaim Defendants consent
to a rezoning of their property, if Counterclaim Defendants fail to comply with
conditions of the Agreement.
Plaintiff is

to obtain a declaration against
the

of the

run, (d)
lS

and therefore it must

Temporary Facility has been in violation of the Teton County zoning laws since March 1,
2009.

Attorney Fees
44.

If Teton County is the prevailing party it is entitled under Paragraph 12(e)

Agreement to be awarded its attorneys fees and costs.
Teton County is also entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-117,
1

and 121.
Prayer

Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff prays for judgment as

,.

1

2.

For a decree establishing that the 18 month period to construct the

Permanent Facility has not been tolled and that the 18 month period has expired;
3.

For a decree stating that the Agreement has not been breached by Teton

County and that Bums' has no right to rescission;
4.

For a decree stating that if the Agreement is rescinded than the zone

change from C-3 to M-1 would also be rescinded;
5.

For a

that Teton County has the right, by agreement and

additional

6.
this

IDAHO

as 1s

of June, 2013.

)
) ss.
)

Tetnn f'rmnty
being
sworn,
that she
has read the
the contents thereof and the ame are true to the best
knowledge, information and belief.

l

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this [ ~ay of June, 2013. Witness
my hand and official seal.

2nn-=-~~.
Notary Public
commission

5

\ \- \ q

-

13

correct
or

causing to be placed a

thereof

a

to

United

mail,

prepaid, addressed to:

Robert B. Bums
Kimberly D. Evans
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chartered
P.O. Box 51505
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

~L)(\

[ X] U.S. Mail [ ] Hand [ ] Fax

~ 2_R1~~-

~1emon;;Iega1 Assistant

6

Drive Suite
Office Box 51505
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone (208) 522-6700
Facsimile (208) 522-5111
rbb@moffatt.com
kde@moffatt.com
1

Attorneys

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants

DISTRICT COURT OF
OF

FOR

CO'l\JCRETE,
an
and BlJRNS HOLDINGS,
limited liability company,

165

TO
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
vs.
TETON C01JNTY, a political subdivision of
the
of Idaho,
Defenda11t/Counterclaimant.

Counterdefendants Bums Concrete, Inc. and Bums Holdings, LLC Uointly,
each and every averment contained in the Counterclaim filed
by Counterclaimant

11,

13,in

I

averments in
by

admitted

are true

no

111

and conect
2.

Bums admits the avennents in paragraphs 2 through 6

3.

Bums denies

the

Counterclaim.

Paragraph
the

avennents in paragraph 7 of the Counterclaim, as
required Bums "to erect

of the Developer's Agreement
Temporary Facility.
4.

5

Burns admits the averments in paragraphs 8 through 12

response to

the

Bums

13

Facility was to be completed pursuant to Paragraph
Agreement

eighteen (1

reason

months from

the application

the

date

execution of the

"subject

31,
111

paragraph.
6.
substance of

In response to paragraph 14 of the Counterclaim, Burns admits
averment, notwithstanding minor errors in the purported quotation.
avennents in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Counterclaim.

'7

I.

Burns denies

8.

Burns admits the avennents in paragraph 17 of

Counterclaim.

avennent in paragraph 8 of the Counterclaim.

9.

-2

to

U.

it

9

21

to
to the
averment states a conclusion of law to

no response is required.
and

Counterclaim.

12.

Bums denies the avennents in paragraphs

13.

Bums admits the avennents in paragraphs 24 through

14.

Burns denies the avennents in

of the

Counterclaim.

29 through 31 of the

Counterclaim.

COUNT
15.
1
] 6.

1

Burns admits

17.

of

ave1111ents in

response to paragraph

Counterclaim.

Counterclaim, Burns admits the
letter

statement

sets

or

the controlling terms of the "subject
Developer's Agreement
18.

response to paragraph 35

Burns admits

rnajenre clause protects a party to a contract if an obligation cannot be perfonned
that are specified within

scope of the particular clause,

from . . action beyond Developer's ·

as in the particular
control."

a force

to causes

1 .

to

2L

to

averment states a conclusion of law to which no response is required.
In response to paragraph 39 of the Counterclaim, Bums admits that the
provision accurately states Idaho Code§ 67-651 l(d).
. .,
2 .) .

Bums admits the averments in paragrapb 40

the Counterclaim, but

any height limitation applies to the Temporary Facility, which

and

not a building or fixture.
24.

two purposes

In response to paragraph 41

the Counterclaim, Bums

that one of

in Paragraph
defined Permanent

being

allow the Developer
25.

, Burns] to

In response to paragraph

of the Counterclaim, Bums denies

sets
admits that the paragraph applies if, and subject to, Bums' unexcused failure to comply with
any of the conditions of the agreement.
26.

denies

avem1ents in paragraphs 43

45

the

Counterclaim.
AFFIRlVIATIVE DEFENSES
Counterclaim fails to state a claim

can

granted.

are

to

to

011

1

lS

s Agreement to be

reasonable

of the

costs.

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Bums prays for judgment on the Counterclaim as follows:
1.

for judgment

the

be dismissed and Teton

nothmg thereby;
2.

for an

of all costs and

including reasonable attorney

as

just

13.

&

( ) Hand
( ) Overnight
( ) Facsimile

Telephone:
Facsimile: 208.522.5111
kde@moffatt.com
19449.0005
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON

-

BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,

Case No. CV-201

165

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
vs.
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of
the State of Idaho,
Defendant/Counterclaima.11t.

Plaintiffs Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings, LLC Gointly, "Burns") hereby move
to Rule 56(a) and (c), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, for the entry of summary
judgment in Burns' favor on the liability components only of Counts I - III of the Verified
Complaint for:
~,~u~,,,.,.,.,.,

(i) Declaratory Judgment, (ii) Breach

Contract and Rescission, (iii) Unjust

filed May 21, 2013 (the "Verified Complaint"), against Defendant

County,

to

(ii)
and

fiied June 11,

13, and (iv) the

affidavit

undersigned counsel being filed concurrently herewith.
DATED this 8th day of August 2014.

MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK& FIELDS,
CHARTERED

By

to be served by the method indicated

and addressed to the following:

TETON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
89 N. Main St., Suite 5
Driggs, ID 83422
(208) 354.2994

( )
Mail, Postage Prepaid
I~\Hand Delivered
NJ)vemight Mail
·( ) Facsimile

-3

Facsimile: 208.522.5111
kde@moffatt.com
19449.0005
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON

BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,

Case No. CV-201

165

EVANS ROSS
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

-

vs.
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of
the State ofldaho,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

I, KIMBERLY D. EVANS ROSS, being duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as

follows:
1.

I am counsel of record for Plaintiffs Bums Concrete, Inc. and Bums Holdings,

partial
judgment, which

is acknowledged by

County

its discovery responses to

as having been sent by Teton County.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Fis a true and correct copy of the letter referenced in

paragraph 28 of the Statement of Facts included in Bums' supporting memorandum for partial
summary judgment, which letter is acknowledged by Teton County in its discovery responses to
as having been received by Teton County.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of the letter referenced in
29 of the Statement of Facts included in Bums' supporting memorandum for partial
judgment, which

as
5.

been sent by

is acknowledged by Teton County in

discovery responses to

County.

i1;tttached
30 of the Statement of Facts include

the letter referenced in
Bums' supporting memorandum for partial

summarJ judgment, which letter is acknowledged by Teton County in its discovery responses to
as having been sent by Teton County.

to

of

Residing at="""-'~'---'-=-=My Commission Expires

to

by

method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Kathy ""''' ..,,"'r
TETON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
89 N. Main St., Suite 5
Driggs, ID 83422
(208) 354.2994
0

U S M,;\1·1L' PoQt,;icre
-t:,
( J Hand Delivered
,,JQ Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
1 )
\

•

>

L~

L

U

PrPpairl
L -

L~

Board of County Commissioners

Kirk Butn.s
Bums Concrete, Inc.
2385 Gallatin A venue
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

Octobe r 4, 2012

Dear Mr. Burns:
On April 9, 2012 the Coooty s.ent you a written request to remove your "Temporary
Facility" by July 1, 2012. Nothing has been done to rem ove the facility as oft.he date of the
present letter. fn accordance with Paragraph 2(b)(vi) of the Development Agreement for Burns
Hoiding, LLC filed in Teton County as Instrument#.191250 on September 5, 2007, the County
has revoked Burns Holding's authority to operate their "Temporary Facility.'' Please commence
removal activity immediately.
·

Kathryn Rinaldi, Chair
Teton County Board of C ounty Commissioners

EXHIBIT E

Boise
Idaho Falls
Pocatello

David S. Jensen
Junes L. Marrin
A. Peterman

Mark$. Prusynski
Stephen R. Thomas
Glenna M. G-irisce:n::;en

Gcrud T. Husch
Scott L Caropbdl

Roben; B. Burns
J\.fid,acl E. Thomas
Pau!cia :M:. Olsson

C. Oayton Gill
Michad W. McGreaham
David P. G-.udner
Julian E. G-abiola
·Kirnbedy D. Evans Ross
Jon A. Srenquisc
Muk C. Peterson
Tyler]. Anderson
J.,ndrew J. Walder,

Ritchie
G.Hillen
Marthew J. McGee
Mindy M. Willman
Andrea]. Rosholt
Jetta H>rdi Mathews

-0829

Physical Address

October 1 2012
via Certified Mail
and US. Mail

Robecc E. Bakes, ofcounsel
Norman M. Semankot ofcounsel

US Bank Plaza
101 S Capitol Blvd 10th Fl
Boise ID 83702-7710

208 345 2000
800422 2889

208 385 5384 fax

Willis C Molli,.tc, 1907-1980
Eugentc C Thomas, 1931-20 l 0
John W Ba.m:cr, 1931-2011
Kirk R. Hdviec, 1956-2003

wwtJ.moffatl.com

Dylan B. L.wre-nce:

Teton County Board of County Commissioners
Teton County Courthouse
150 Courthouse Drive
Driggs, ID 83422
Re:

Burns Holdings, LLC/Your Notice of Revocation Dated October 4, 2012 -Notice of
Default
MTBR&FFile No. 19449.5
Dear Commissioners:
By your notice of October 2012, to
Concrete, Inc. (which is an affiliate of Burns
Holdings, LLC ("Bums Holdings") and is jointly referred to with
Holdings in this letter
as the "Developer") you provided notice of the revocation of the Developer's authority to
a concrete manufacturing facility located in Teton Peaks \lie\cv Subdivision (the
"Temporary Facility'). The cited authority for your notice was Paragraph 2(b )(vi) of the
Developer's Agreement for Bums Holdings, LLC (the "Agreement"), which was recorded in
Teton County (the "County') on September 5, 2007, as Instrument No. 191250. For the
reasons set forth below, your notice constitutes a breach of the Agreement. Accordingly, in
accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 8 of the Agreement, the Developer hereby
provides the County with the Notice of Default required by the terms of the Agreement.
This Notice of Default is based on the followmg facts and legal authority:
1.

The terms of the Agreement were negotiated by and between the Developer and
representatives of both the County and the City of Driggs ..

2.

Paragraph 2.b(iii) and Exhibit C of the Agreement provide for the Developer's
constrnction of its desired 75 foot building (the "Permanent Facility").

3.

fo accordance with
Commission heard on

requirements, the City Driggs' Planning and Zoning
11, 2007, and unanimously recommended for approval by

F

CITent:2611010.1

County bot.h the Agreement
the issuance of a conditional use permit allovving
the 75 foot height of the Permanent Facility (the "CUP").
4.

Thereafter, on or about August 31, 2007, the County and the Developer entered into the
Agreement and the County caused the Agreement to be recorded.

5.

Following the execution of the Agreement, the Developer expended many hundreds of
thousands of dollars constructing and implementing the commitments imposed under
the Agreement, including erecting and operating the Temporary Facility required under
Paragraph 2.b(v) of the Agreement and constructing the road and highway
improvements required under Paragraph 2.d(iv) of the Agreement.

6.

After the Developer had incurred the foregoing costs as required by the Agreement, and
notwithstanding the unanimous reconunendation for approval by the City of Driggs'
Planning and Zoning Commission and the determination of the County's attorney that
the Agreement was a valid and binding contract, the Teton County Board of County
Commissioners (the "Commission") voted to deny the CUP on November 15, 2007.

7.

The Developer confirmed with the County's director of planning and zoning, Kurt
on
2007, that the County would not issue building permit
the construction oft.he 75 foot Permai,ent Facility specified in the Agreement.

8.

The Developer has since that time undertaken every act reasonably possible to obtain
the permits and variance required by the County for the Developer to construct the
Perrrnmerit Facility, which permits and variance the County has refused to issue and has
worked to frustrate at each and every step.

9.

The Developer cam1ot now construct the Permanent Facility without an amendment to
the ordinances of the County, over which amendment the Developer has no control.

10.

Section 2.b(iv) of the Agreement provides, in relevant part: "The installation of the
Permanent Facility shall be completed within eighteen (18) months of execution of this
Agreement by the County subject to delays
... any ~ther act
majeure or action beyond Developer's control."

11

The term "force majeure" means: "An event or effect that can be neither anticipated nor
controlled." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 718 (9th ed. 2009).

12.

Thus, because the
cannot now and has not ever been able to construct the
Permanent Facility by reason of events and actions by
no
1

Ciient2611070.1

13.

The County's reliance on Paragraph 2.b(vi) of the
("In the event the
Permanent Facility is not completed within the time allowed herein... fails to give
effect to the tolling of the 18-monthperiod specified in Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the
Agreement by the force-majeure clause contained in that same paragraph which
tolling the County has implicitly acl'11owledged for the last several years by not earlier
seeking to stop the operation of the Temporary Facility.

14.

Moreover, the following legal principles would proscribe the County's revocation of the
Developer's authority to operate the Temporary Facility even in the absence of the
application of the force-majeure clause contained in the Agreement:
A condition precedent is an event nor certain to. occur, but
which must occur, before performance u11der a contract becomes
61
due. Steiner v. Ziegler Tamura Ltd., Co., 138 Idaho 238,
P.3d 595,599 (2002}(citing World.Wide Lease, Inc. v.
Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880,887,728 P.2d 769,776
(Ct.App.1986)). A condition precedent may be expressed in the
parties' agreement. Id. When there is a failure 0f a
precedent through no fault of the parties, no liability or duty to
is the cause
perfom1 anses under the contract. Id. \Vhere a
of the failure of a condition precedent, he cannot take advantage
of the failure. Fish v. Fleishman, 87 Idaho 126, 133, 391 P.2d
344, 348 (1964) ( citing 3A COF.BIN ON CONTF_A.CTS, § 767 (1960)
COne who uajustly prevents the performance or the happening of
a condition of his own promissory duty thereby eliminates it as
such a condition. He will not be pennitted to take advantage of
his own wrong, and to escape from liability for not rendering his
promised performance by preventing the happening of the
condition on which it was promised.")).
Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Tmst, 141 Idaho 123, 128 (2005).

15.

Accordingly, both by application ofthe force-majeure clause contained in the
Agreement and the legal principles articulated in Dengler, the Developer is now and has
always been in full compliance with the obligations imposed by the Agreement.

Based on the foregoing facts and legal authorities, demand is hereby made as follows:
County contends the Developer has breached or is m default of the Agreement,
provide the Developer with "not less than thirty (30) days Notice of
that the
nature

Clicnt:261107D.1

during which said default may be
the manner and period
satisfactorily cured"
accordance with the requirements imposed under Paragraph 8
of the Agreement;
(ii)

That the County take no further action adverse to the Developer's rights under the
Agreement without first providing a written Notice of Default and opportunity to cure
the alleged default as is expressly required by Paragraph 8 of the Agreement~ and

(iii)

That the County provide the Developer with a vmtten retraction of its notice of
revocation dated October 4, 2012, within 30 days of the County's receipt of this letter
which demand is hereby made subject to the Developer's reservation of rights to treat
any further action by the County that is adverse to the Developer's
under the
Agreement or the County's failure to retract its notice of revocation within said 30 days
as a repudiation of the County's obligations Turider the Agreement

/

No

notice or demand will be made before suit is filed to recover aJl damages incurred by
together with my client's reasonable attorney fees and costs
to Paragraph

RBB/bjl/kdp
cc:

Kirk Burns (via E-mail)
Linda Szimhardt (via E-mai[)
Dale W. Storer, Esq. (via E-mail)
Kimberly Evans Ross, Esq. (via E-mail)

Client:2611070_ 1

¥-ath.y Spil:z:et, Pr~fulg . Mtcincy
1'cirut Cotmly Coo:rlnonoo
89 N. Slroer;. Sh?.. 6, DrlSWJ, ID 8M22
(2(lB) 354-im pm=

(:z®}SSHm
kspltzer~ko. letan.id.U$

To:

·1pc City of Driggs

From: Teton CQuncy
Re.:
Request for a public headng in front of the Drlw' Planning nnd Zonirrg Comrnissioa for
the concfiJiOfllll wrung designation ofM~l to revert buck to C-3 due 10 the pnrccl. O\\ner's fallo.ro
an.d i.oahll:ity to comply wifhihe condiuonS of the te-zone..
Dme: October 23 1 1012
On Feb~cy 26, 2001 Bums Holdii:ig:; U.C (lhe "Dcvcl.oJ.)CJ:") obtah)«f n. CQnditiomd zone
cliruig.e :frotn. C-3 to M-1 In order to opei:ate a co~e batch pfanL On August 3 P', 2.007 TelM
County nud. ilii:.. Dcvclo~entcro:1 into aDcvdopvrs Agrc¢;lJicilt (the "~tli'J One of the
conditions oftlte Agteemon:t ·wus that bm Developer construct a 75 foot f:li11 building as depk:ti;d
faExhfuit C oftbc.Agrt;ement. N the rei-wne bearings t!ie Dc,;clopci: rcpc-atcdl:y promis:cl M
cru:Iosoo, modern. batch pf ant tbat would emit little to 110 -dust or no~ To that end the
Ag.rt~nent SU.U::~ that the bntth P.'a."1 will be. entirely enc!~ within Ii building. r e f ~
fultlbit: C-which shows ihe building devution of 15 feet Turoug}wcl the Bunts Holrflllg vs.
Te/_-0n. Cotatry lawsuit, the Developer stated fuata building hcigW. of 15 .teet Wrtll ·iiecessacy to
mlligatc !loond, dust, and 'libnrtlon as well as to opemtec in nn cn:crgy cifiokot tuannet:. · The
Dwcilopers a:ttorney stated lb.at if the buikling hci.ght Wero limi~ thml the concrete batcli plnnt
would ''not be abk to cipci:ate in ml.~
,iffiM~ot ~ @d
rwuire extended opcrnthig

wq.mo

hours:in ordtttomcet local deml'U1.ds for con=te.. Int.he absence of such equipment, ~plant
would be nble to operate Mly as a U.'MSJX)J:t µbmt whfoh would have i n ~ noise mid dust
e.mana.tmg; from the sifo•• ,. Such sc\lMdo muJ.d 1mw increused truck riolse, vibtn1fon and
copgestion. au fill ah:ead~· crowded State lligbwny 33 ootrldor." Appdl41Tt's Brief~ 6-1 (dting
CUP-Tr. Vql II, p, 10, LL 1-2.S). I)cyclopot alsq smtes fuat without a 75 foot height there wuuld
bo !llQl"O tro:& exhaust em:lssi-Olls l=ausc ooncrete-would have to llili:ed in indMaual 1 , . ~
Appi!lfr;nt'.r Brlefp, 1 (citing CUP-Tr, Vol II. p. H. LL 14-24~ llb vccyilkar from the
transcriptof fuc zone change hearings arld in the Developer's Agreement that the only reason for
the zone clwige '.Vas to a:llmv op=tion of a coru::tcici batch plmit thal would ~.I® fi\,00 of (h~
hm::rnful cff~. Ifthes,:; ~ effects wuld .oot bt;. l"lllCiYlnkd th® fue Z(}11(} dl,mge vlould 'not

have been gnrnted..
Although the Developer \Vas gµmted a condlti&rutl .rc:zone ta M-1 1 a zone in which a ooncrete
plant ls a permitted use, in onlerto coostnrctthcir proposed 1S foot tall p!Mlthoyrequircd. a
CUP. Wit'buw: !he CUP the Developer could noi constro« the specific batch plllllt that was
pro.robed in ardc:r to obtain the ronc change.

Oo N-Ovei:nhet'. 15, 2007 the Teto!1 Cotmty 11o:i.rd of ConttnitSionea dcmied Appellant's
oonditional use peun1t appli~tioa an<! thus Dcv¢lopec was unab!c fo build a batch pll!nt who sc
height exceeded 45 foci. On Jxx:etnbet 11, 2007 lh$ Develop~ filed forj udicM review of the
County's decision to &:ny the CUI'!-. T.bid lfl>~uit mncludi:;di:n Janlilll}' of20l2 w:ith a Supreme
Court dcd:tion thnt upheld the County's decision to deny the CUP. The Saprenu, Co\Ut also
stated 1ha4 based upon current law, the Devclppcr would have (o obtain II VIT!lM<;e to exceed 1,he
bcight limitation in tbe Driggs' Area ofimpa:ct

EXHIBIT G

oSq

Am ate
ln th$
in a ~ e
with Idaho Code 61-65I I.A. !hat Driggs
De.~s parocl revert:
oocl:: to (l Cl zone.. Idaho Cooe 67-651 lA ~res that a &vclopment a : ~ may be
term~ted and a zacing drngn.afion ~ ulhc ft:<ttll1"ctrtei'lts in ibe:A~ are .!lO( mcl
wtihlti a ~abfo fune or tlp!ln too fuilure of the o\VI!cr ofthe p ~ to C®1_Ply with the
oondllions in~ agreemeAf. At the bearltlg b¢tbre the Drlgg;,; • Planning md Zoning
CofllliUSsion, t11e Developer rutcd that bo ~l ~ to ~ l y with~ 75 f\Xlt hclght
condition by applying for 1r. ~ . ·11» Cwnty tberefure wifudrcw its appiicauo:n: Co revert
=rung~ tile outcome of thi:: Dc:vcl~ vnri1moe application. DritJSS' Planning ond
Zonlttg Commission ~ n d e d denilil of the Deveklpets v~rlance ~ and the Boord of
Cotm!J (;orumfzslllnetS denied the variance applicauon Cin Scptanher 13, 10 J:1. No judicial
tcvicw of ili1s decision w a s ~ and tl:-c 28 day time .frmr.¢ for this .:i\XjW:$t to be made to
Distdct Court Ms p,I\SSed. Thus, the varlance dcnlal is a fimtl ru1<l unreviewable decision.
Bee.ause ilie.te is no legal means ctitt~tfy aVl'!ilab!e i:o th~ Th,\'i,lcl:apcr to build the promised batch
plant;~ Cotlttly ha:reby ~hrttlis ibi applletition. fo revert !he zo11lng o:fthe De:vclopc:r'z parcel
btid: to C...3 !ti. ~ r e with Trfohcr Code 67-651 IA
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I

Kathy Spitzer, Prosecuting A ttorney
Teton County Courthouse
89 N. Street, Ste. S, Driggs, ID 83422
(208) 354-2990 phone

RECEIVED

(208) 354-2994

NOV O7 2012

kspitzer@co .te ton.id.us

MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT.
ROCK & FIELDS. CHTD

November 5, 2012
Robert Bums
P.O. Box 829
Boise, ID 83 70 l
Dear Mr. Bums:
Thank you for your letter dated October 15, 20~12. Your letter alleges two reasons why the
authority to operate the temporary facility cannot be revoked: 1) the force majeure clause in the
Developer's Agreement; and 2) that the building of the permanent faci lity is a condition
precedent to the revocation of authority to operate the temporary facility. I respectfully disagree
with both reasons.
First, there can be no event of force majeure if the event could have been anticipated.
'The developer was on notice of the applicable zoning laws that restricted the building's hei ght to
45 feet unless a CUP was granted .. Force_rnajeure claus_es do not .?9Yer government regulation .
suc_h ZOQin.gJaws., f::tirthen:nore; the for<:frnaj,~ure cl~ujfi _i~ n'cifreleva'nttb t}ie temporary .
fiidHty; it -relat~s ;nly)o the trrn{liinitati6n roj'.26mp,Jy_t1on\l the pernianeht'fa_2ifily?fBei 'fo~ce
rnajew:e cl~l:!Se;is,lnappl1cab le to !~fpiesent sitllatiqn.', .
.· <
.
,.·

as

' I •'

'

'

•

C

'

.•

,

f

Second, Paragraph 2(b)(v oFtlte Dev6JSper's Agreernent statei thafthe'purpose' of the '
Temporary Facility is to '.'facilitate and ·s\lpport the construction of the Permanent Facil ity/' The
temporary facil ity was not a condition precedent to an event, but an accommodation. Because the
Developer is prohibited from building the Permanent Facility, there is no longer a need to
"facilitate and support" its construction. Paragraph 2(b)(iv) of the Agreement states that
construction of the Permanent Facility shall commence immediately upon execution of the
Agreement. Construction of the Permanent Facility could not be commenced immediately
because the height limit in the area was 45 feet At the time of signing the Agreement the
Developer knew he had to obtain a CUP or a variance, and in fact had applied for a CUP in June
of 2007. No one knew whether the Developer would be granted the CUP until the BOCC made
their decision on November. Thus, at the time of signing the Agreement the Developer knew he
could not perform.
Throughout your letter you blame the County for your client's predicament. The case law you
cite regarding conditions precedent involve wrongdoing and fault on the party enforcing
performance. By law, the permits sought by the Developer were uncertain - the County did not,
as yo u state in Paragraph 8 of your letter, work to frustrate their approval. During the zone
change hearings the Developer faikd to mention that a 75 foot tall building would be necessary
to construcLthe repres~'nted facility·. The 75 footheigl;it was depicted in an exhibit to the August
2007 Development Agreement, but a 75 foot heighfwas riot mentioned in any public bearing'
(until the CUP application hearings)' and could not have been approved viithout a public hearing

EXHIBIT H

o lo I

must

Concrete to remove
first notice was provided on April 9, 2012. Paragraph 8 of the
and period oftime to cure need only be supplied "where appropriate." You admit in your letter
that the Developer has no means by which to comply with its promises. The Developer cannot
cure its default and thus a manner and period of time to cure need not be supplied. Nonetheless,
the April 9th letter did give deadlines for removal of the facility, deadlines that the Developer
ignored. The County again sent a request to remove the Tempora1y Facility to your client on
October 4, 2012, and that request has been iisnored. Our next request will be made in Court.
Uf',LvvLUviH

Sins;.erely,

/a~;;;~
Kathy Spitzer

cc. Board of County Commissioners, Teton County

date: 8/21/20
Time: 8:38 am
Judge: Dane Watkins Jr
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen
Kimberly Evans Ross, Plaintiffs Counsel
Kathy Spitzer, Defendant's Counsel

J calls case;

ids those present

not being
objection
a concrete plant on
PA - Land use regulations
Long process to get temporary batch
\!\/ant Permanent batch
Long drawn out relationship
Appeal to SC
to figure out what contract is
DA

development agreement for a zone change to allow build

After zone cha~ge

wanted to build something

feet higher which was 30 'higher than

will be -

be dispositive

- SJ will be pivotal

J - when filed

May 21, 2013

J- how long would DA like
DA

two weeks would be great

J going to suggest 45 days
- would like to get moving
month plenty

J

time

will allow month to

DA

weeks

J- will do in Teton

J - November 20 in Teton County

10:00

J will file in Teton County, shoot me a copy
Clerk will send notice

BURNS CONCRETE, INC.,
an Idaho corporation, and
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

Case No.

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
V.

CV-13-165

J\10TION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision
the State ofldaho,
Defendant/Counterclaim ant.

m

of

Procedure, moves the Court for entry of summary judgment in Teton County's
summary

favor. The basis and grounds

are explained in the attached

Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment.
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that the Court enter sumrnary
judgment in Teton County's favor on Counts I and II ofDefendant/Counterclaimant's
Counterclaim and that the Court award Defendants attorney fees and costs in this matter
and for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Dated this 1st11 dav., of September
~

4

Honorable Dane Watkins
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 North Capital
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

Kimberly D. Evans Ross
AJtorney at Law
1120 East 1275 North
Shelley, ID 83274

)8
D
D
D

:a
D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

was

Defendant Teton

COUNTY

BURNS CONCRETE, INC., AN IDAHO
CORPORATION, AND BURNS HOLDINGS,
LLC, AN IDAHO LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

CaseNo.

CV-13-165

AFFIDAVIT OF KATHY SPITZER

V.

Defendant/Counterclaimant.

STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss
)
County of Teton
I, KATHY SPITZER, being duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows:
1.

I am counsel of record for Defendant, Teton County in the above-entitled

action and make factual statements set forth below based on my own personal
knowledge.

3.

E is a true and correct copy

Attached
Brief filed with

pages 6

7
I

Docket

Idaho Supreme Court on Case

38269-2010, and referenced on pages 17 & 18 of Teton County's Supporting
Memorandum for summary judgment.
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of pages 2 & 3 of

Appellant's Reply Brief filed with the Idaho Supreme Court on Case No. CV-07-376,
Docket No. 38269-2010, and referenced on page 17 of Teton County's Supporting
Memorandum
5.

summary judgment.
Attached hereto as Exhibit

is a true and correct copy

the letter

County's supporting memorandum for

referenced on page 19
judgment.
6.

hereto as

of the letter

referenced on Page 20 of Teton County's supporting memorandum for summary
judgment.

DATED this Jf_tay of September, 2014.

JAN CLEMONS
Notary Public
State of Idaho

Residing at:
Idaho
Commission Expires: 11/1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY
that on
filed, served, or copied as follows:

of September, 2014 the foregoing was

DOCUMENT FILED:
Honorable Dane Watkins
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 North Capital
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

Kimberly
Attorney at Law
1120 East 1275 North
Shelley, ID 83274

S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail
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BURNS HOLDING, LLC CUP DENIAL
TET0!'1GO.IDD1STRIGt
ltMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAVI
The following are amended fin dings of fact and conclµsions of law for the denial
of the Bums Holdings, LLC's Conditional Use Permit application by the Board of
County Commissioners of Teton County on November 15, 2007. iul references to the
Driggs City Ordin ances r efer to the January 16, 2007 version.

1. Conclusion of Law
Bums Holding, LLC must apply fo r a variance to exceed the 45 foot h eight limitation in
the M-1 zone. Idaho Code§ 67-6516 clearly states that: "[a] variance is a modification
of the bulk and placement requirements of the ordinance as to . . . height of buildings, or
other ordinance provision affecting the size or shape of a structure." The applicant
requests a modification of the height of a building and therefore must apply for a variance
and not a conditional use permit. The Idaho Constitution, fu'iicle XIl, § 2, provides, "Any
county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such
local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with
the general laws." "A local ordinance that conflicts with a state law or is preempted by
state regulation of the subj ect matter, is void." Arthur v. Sh oshone County, 133 Idaho
854,862,993 P.2d 617, 625 (Idaho App.2000); citing Envirosafe Serv. ofIdaho v.
County of Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687, 689, 735 P.2d 998, 1000 (1987). Because the County
cannot act in conflict w ith State law it reads any ambiguity in the Driggs Ordinance in
ha..TID.ony with the Local Land Use Pla.nning Act.

Finding of F act
Chapter 2, Section 13 C of the City ofDriggs' Ordinance 281-07 states that " [a]ny
building or structure or portion thereof hereafter erected shall not exceed forty-five (45)
feet in height unless approved by conditional use p ermit." (Emphasis added.) The
Countyit1terprets this section of the ordinance as follows: "[a]nybuilding or structure or
p ortion thereof hereafter erected shall not exceed forty-five (45) feet in height." Any
other reading ofthis section of the Driggs City Ordinance would directly conflict with §
67-6516 of the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUP A") which clearly states that a
v ariance and not a conditional use permit must be obtained before one can modify the
height of a building. That portion of the Driggs ordinance that could be interpreted so as
to conflict with State law is void, of no effect, as if it had never existed. The County finds
that the applicant did not make the correct application for a height variance and that it is
not possible for the County to grant a ClJP to Bums Holding, LLC in order to allow them
to build a structure which is 30 feet higher than_ the maximum height allowed in the M-1
zone. A conditional use permit is much easier to obtain than a variance. The applicant
cannot get around a very clear area of State law by applying for a CUP, even when the
Driggs code uses the term "conditional use permit", when State law is clear that a
v a,....-jance is required.
Referenc es to the need for a "variance" occurred at least twenty times du.ring the
N ovember 15 , 2007 h earing. Some of Chairman Young's first words were: "This is a
conditional use permit hearing for a height variance." 4: 17- 18. The first time the
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Page 1 of7
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applicant :himself spealcs he states that he is requesting a height variance. 9: 15-16. Sandy
Mason, representing Valley Advocates for Responsible Development stated: "VARD
does not recommend granting a ClJP for this height variance for several reasons ." The
applicant' s attorney, Dale Storer, a renowned local government, planning and zoning
attorney, 1 was present during the bearing and has represented tti:e applicant during the
entire process. Iv.l:r. Storer failed to clarify the situation or give reasons in the applicant' s
response why a CUP was the correct method for a height variance when the Idaho Code
is ciear t.hat a variance is required for an increased height. Regardless, the County does
not feel that the applicant was unaware or uninformed of the law. 2
2. Condusion of Law
Idaho Code§ 67-6512(a) states
A special use permit may be granted to an applicant if the proposed use is
conditionally permitted by the terms of the ordinance, subject to conditions
pursuant to specific provisions of the ordinance, subject to the ability of
political subdivisions, including school districts, to provide services for the
proposed use, and when it is not in conflict with the plan.
Section 2 of the City of Driggs' Orclirnu1ce 274-07 also addresses condition al use permit
procedures, offering criteria similar to the above and adding that there must be conditions
imposed upon the use that assure protection and compatibility with the surrounding
properties, uses and neighborhood. An applicant must meet all five of these tests in order
to be granted a C(JP. A finding that an applicant does not meet one of the five criteria is
sufficient to deny an application. Even if the County were to analyze the application
according to the rules governing a conditional use permit, Burns H olding failed to meet
four of the five of the necessary criteria for approval.
Finding of Fact.
A.

The CUP could not be .granted because a h eight of 75 feet is not
conditionally permitted by the specific terms of the ordinance.

The Driggs M-1 zoning ordinance lists two categories of uses for the M-1 zone,
allowed and conditional. Allowed uses are listed under Chapter 2, Section 13(A) .and
Section 13(B) lists the ten (10) "Conditional Uses Permitted". A height of 75 feet is not

1

Excerpt from firm bio: Mr. Storer has served as the City Attorney for the City ofidaho Falls since 1982
and he also represents a number of other smaller cities, school districts, counties, electrical utilities and
private developers. He has served three terms as president of the Idaho Municipal Attorneys Association
and he currently serves on the board of directors for the Idaho Municipal Attorneys Association and as the
Idaho state chairman of the International Municipal Lawyers Association. He has frequently testified
before the Idaho State L egislature on a variety of issues affecting cities, counties and other public entities.
2

In the County's initial brief on judicial review of the CUP denial it states: "What is significant about
Petitioner's Cl JP application is that it was not looking to modify the zoning of the site, but rather to m odif;
the allowable height of the building on the site. " Respondents B1ief, August 5, 2008, page 9.

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Page 2 of7

t)"l~

are mentioned in Section 1
ordinance
states:
or structure or portion thereofherea..fter erected shall not exceed forty-five (45)
County does not believe
this
unless approved by conditional use permit."
overrides the specific provisions of Section 13(B) of fae ordina..TJ.ce. If Section
13(C) were interpreted as conditionally permitting a 75 foot high structure then
ordinai1.ce would have to be interpreted as conditionaily permitting a building of
height and size, skyscrapers included. An ordinance provision cannot be read in isolation
but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document. Chapter l(D) ofDrigg's
City Ordinance 274-07 states as its intent "that this Ordinance be·
and
construed to further the purposes of this Ordinance a..11d the objectives and characteristics
of the
districts." The stated purpose of the Ordinance is to:
[P]romote pride ownership, health, safety, comfort, convenience and general
welfare of the residents of the City ofDnggs and to achieve the following
objectives:
1. To protect property rights and enhance property values.
2. To provide for
protection and enhancement of the local economy.
3. To ensure that important environmental features are protected and
enhanced.
4. To encourage
protection of prime agricultural lands for the
production of food.
To
concentration of population and overcrowding of la..Ttd.
To ensure that the development ofland is commensurate with the
physical characteristics of the land.
hazards and
7 To protect life and property' areas subject to
disasters.
8. To protect recreation resources.
9. To avoid undue water and air pollution.
10. To secure safety from fire and provide adequate open spaces for light
and air.
11. To implement the comprehensive plan.
12. To provide the manner and form of preparing and processing
applications for modification of and variances from zoning regulations;
13. To encourage the proper distribution and compatible integration of
commercial and industrial uses within designated areas; and
14. To insure that additions and alterations to, and/or remodeling of,
existing buildings or structures are completed in compliance with the
restrictions and limitations imposed thereunder.
Chapter l(C) of Ordinance 274-07.
*

structures to far exceed allowable

limitations by

a conditional

use permit is not in keeping with the purpose and mtent of the Ordinance and thus the
to
cannot be read as

Law

economy
in
area are
Having a "sky' s th~ limit" ordinance that could essentially block
not protect this economy;
to ensure
important
are protected and enhanced because our
vistas are one of our area's
rmportant environmental assets; 4) fail to ensure that
development of land is
commensurate with the physical characteristics of the land because such an interpretation
not take physical characteristics of the land into account; 5) fail to protect recreation
resources and fail to provide adequate open spaces for light and air because these cannot
provided without a height limitation, views and a
of openness being an ·
of much of the Valley's recreation; 6) fail to implement the comprehensive plan as
explained in paragraph D below; 7) fail to provide the manner and form of preparing
processing applications
modification ai-id variances from zoning regulations
because it would provide confusion in their processing; and 8) fail to provide for the
compatible integration of commercial and industrial uses within designated areas
it is impossible to assure compatibility without some form of height limitation.
Furthermore,
County cannot reconcile an application for a conditional use
pennit for
foot high structure with the clear meaning of Chapter Section 3(A) of the
Ordinai."1.ce. Section 3
is very similar to Idaho
§ 67-6516, and states:
vaiiance is a modification of the requirements
ordinance as to
... height of buildings, size of lots, or other ordinance
affecting fae size or shape of a structure or
of the structure upon the lot.
does not include a change
aufaorized land use.
Vlhen the County
City
Ordinance 27 4-07 as a whole it is clear that a
CUP can only be obtained in an M-1 zone for fae uses listed in Chapter 2, Section 13(B)
and that a height of 7 5 feet is not amongst those uses. The statement in Chapter 2,
Section 13(C) that a building or structure may allowed to exceed forty-five (45)
m
height cannot be read jn isolation. Additionally, because there are no parameters around
this height allowance, the County cannot say that a seventy five foot high structure is
specifically permitted by the terms of the ordinance. Furthermore, as is explained in the
next section, a CUP can only be granted subject to conditions pursuant to specific
provisions of the ordinance. There are no specific provisions listed in Chapter 2, Section
13(C) that suggest how a height modification can be conditioned.
B. The CUP could not be granted pursuant to specific conditions listed in the

Code§ 67-6512(a) also requires faat a CUP not be granted unless it will be
to specific
of the ordinance." There are no
rei;rnr.:11n2: the conditioning of 30 foot height modification in the
ordinance
conditional use
states:
.,....,..,..,-n,-.C',,rt conditional use cannot
meet
conditions necessary to

"subject to conditions

development is maintained properly;
e. Designating
exact location
nature of development;
f Requiring
provision for on-site facilities or services;
Requiring more rest..r:i.ctive standards than those generally required this
ordina..n.ce.
Section 2(A)ofthe City of Driggs' Ordinance 274-07.
of these would be applicable to
uses listed in Chapter2, Section 13(B), none
appear applicable to the height regulation in Section 13(C). Idaho Code clearly states
provisions of
a CUP can only be granted "'subject to conditions pursuant to
ordinance." The County does not feel that there are any conditions that are specific to
height variation provision of Section 13(C).
When the County does consider conditions a-g listed above, it is clear that the
failed to show how they could be met The applicant did not show the County
foe adverse impact ofthis height increase could be minimized nor can the County
a way to minimize the impacts of a building that is 30 feet higher than the 45
maximum. The applicant did introduce some "line of sight" evidence but the County
had
with t:bis evidence. Chairma.TJ. Young explained his skepticism
;.u.,,uuv such as the site angle that was used on pages 40: 12 - 41: 11 of the
l '.:>,
transcript. The County
finds
it cannot
the
timing or duration of the height, once it is allowed it would continue, sequence, timing
thus cannot be adequately controlled. The maintenance of the extra 30 feet
and
is equally difficult to condition and the applicant provided no suggestions.
Maintenance of a development usually refers to trash, weeds, etc., none of which are
concerns 75 feet up in the air. The exact location and nature of the development could not
IIlJillIIllZe
·
of the additional 30
Even though the applicant suggests that
,.a~.v.u.,""' the structure several feet from the property line would minirmze its impact, the
Commissioners do not agree. Because the applicant needs the building to not only be 75
tall, but 60 feet wide these conditions are impossible to meet; applicant is not asking
for a 75 foot cell tower a pencil in the air- but a 60 x 75 foot building. Likewise, the
County fi..nds that no on-site facilities or services or more restrictive standards could
TIJirijmize the impact of a building this
and the applicant agai.."'1 provided no
suggestions as to how this condition could be met. The County thus is unable to grant
the CUP subject to conditions pursuant to specific provisions of the ordinance.
CV.CS..LI-U.•.LV

C. The C1JP could not be granted subject to the ability of political subdivisions,

including school districts to provide services for the proposed use.
subdivisions, including schools, would not be affected by the height

Arnended Findings

The

is as 311
functional,
into the community.
sense of arrival at each end
of the community should be dramatic,
in keepmg with the beauty of Teton
Valley and the surrounding mountains. New buildings should be setback from
and
that
the highway, with ample landscaping, concealed
draws. cm. the western
ai--id
amcultural
'
rr,,,."""."'"

Comprehensive Pla..11., Section
Page 61. One of the stated actions under
to Driggs on Highway
9.4 is to "[c]reate and maintain attractive
(South and Norili) and on Ski Hill Road."
County finds that
application conflicts
with the Driggs' Comprehensive Plai--i because it creates a large industrial structure that
area
Driggs would like to see become a
cannot
adequately shielded in
memorable gateway.

Because a concrete batch
is a permitted use the
1 zone it is not possible
County to impose conditions on the use of the batch plant. This application is not
the uses that-will be conducted on the property but about
height of the building
which
uses will be conducted. When the applicant was granted a conditional zone
were moderating conditions such as landscaping imposed, but none of the
conditions addressed a 7 5 foot height because it was a zone change process and the
height of buildings was not at issue. Now the County is presented with this application
for a conditional use permit to allow a building that is significantly higher than any other
in the area. The County has not been presented with any plausible way to mitigate the
extra 30 feet of height now being requested, nor is it able to craft any conditions that
would assure
uses and neighborhoods protection and
compatibility \A,rit..n the additional 30 feet ofheight. 3 The County therefore finds that a 75
foot height is not compatible with the surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood
where a maximum of 45 feet for all structures is maintained and that the protection and
compatibility of the surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood cannot be assured and
3

did present the
the 75 foot tall by 60 foot wide building back from the edge of the property line would
the additional 30 feet
viewed from the
because the
line
out at the hearing that he was not persuaded by the
argument because
the sight angle would be lower, the top of the building would still be so
t.1-iat it would even project above the crest of the Tetons, unlike any
the

No :mitigation to surrounding neighbors was offered.As mentioned earlier, the

idea that

TETON C01JNTY:

~/11,~~
Kathy~, Commissioner

~-;;-~~
Robert Benedict, Commissioner

storm water retention pond was attached as Exhibit "B" to
Renderings

proposed

CUP

building were also attached as Exhibit

. AR

photo graph of a temporary batch plant facility, which is not enclosed and which does not incorporate

any of the mitigating features Bums proposed, was also attached as Exhibit "D" to the Application.
AR p. 9. Elevation views of the facility, as enclosed by a proposed wall and landscaping, were also

attached as Exhibit

. l\Rp. 10.

concrete plant was specifically designed to operate in an

energy-efficient manner using state-of-the-art dust control systems. Ibid. The enclosed building was
ii1tended to mitigate sound, dust and vibration, as well as provide an

ex-terior that would

harmonious and compatible with buildings on surrounding properties. Ibid.
(45)

eighteen (18) percent of the floor space of the entire building. AR p. 127. This
building was necessary in order to enclose

only
section of the

dust collection system and to prevent noise from

disturbing adjacent agricultural and industrial uses. Ibid. If the building height was limited to fortyfive (45) feet, the plant would not be able to operate on an energy efficient basis and would require
extended operating hours in order to meet the local demands for concrete. Ibid. In the absence of
such equipment, the plant would be able to operate only as a transport plant which would have
increased noise and dust emanating from the site. CUP Tr Vol Il, p. 10, LL. 1 through 25. Such
height li.rnitation would also have reduced the production capabilities of the plant, thereby creating
the likelihood that concrete would need to be brought into Teton Valley from. elsewhere. Such
6
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APPELLANTS BRIEF

concrete

not

through
ISSUES
the Board's use of the Comprehensive Plan and the broad, general goals stated

1.

therein, as a regulatory ordinance violate Burns' due process rights under the Constitutions of the
United States and the State ofidaho, as well as this Court's holding in Urrutia v. Blaine County?
2.

Did Teton County's use ofthe Comprehensive Plan to impose additional requirements

for a CUP beyond
3.

findings and conclusions arbitrary and capricious because they do not
the

Idaho Code§ 67-6535?
Did the Board abuse its discretion by revisiting the issue of consistency wifh the
Comprehensive Plan notwithstanding the passage of the applicable appeal period under Idaho Code

§ 67-6519(4)?
5.

Is Bums entitled to an award of attorneys fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-

1
ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL
Burns seeks attorneys fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117 for the reason that the
County's denial of the CUP permit was \vithout a reasonable basis in law or in
7
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APPELLANT'S BRJEF

Specifically,

case is adequately set

nature
as

as

m

Respondent's

Bums has no objection to the County's Statement of

except with respect to its

statement that "throughout the Driggs Comprehensive Plan, the area north of Driggs is referred to
as a 'gateway'." Resp. Brief, p. 9. As was noted

Appellant's Brief, the term "gateway" was

nowhere defined in the Comprehensive Plan, in terms
16. The term itself suggests a "bookend" concept

no particular dimensions. Burns' proposed

be located five hundred

(550)

corridor established by Teton County. AR
only extends

hundred thirty (330)

County Zoning Ordinance. As will

length or v.ridth. App. Brief, pp. 14-

on

of Highway

well

The scenic conidor parallels Highway
side. Appendix E, section 8-5-2(d)(l),

argued below, the undefined parameters of such

-

"gateway" in large part lead to Burns' due process argument, as outlined in pages 10-17, inclusive,
of Appellant's Opening Brief.
brief comment should also be made with respect to Burns' response to Commissioner

noted in Respondenf s Brief, at the time the rezone was sought Burns contemplated a building height
approximately forty-five (45) feet. Resp. Brief p. 7. At that point in time, the plant had not yet
been designed and was conceptual in nature
2

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRlEF

Burn.s later learned that by increasing the height

more
ill

vibration could be minimized, thereby diminishing impact on adjoining properties. AR p. 10.
Anticipating that these changes would render t.h.e project more compatible with adjacent properties
a..nd anticipating that the Commissioners would welcome such changes, Bu..rns filed its application
for a CUP four months later.
Chairman Young's question demonstrated his apparent ignorance of the rezoning process.
Since the matter involved a rezone, the Board should have been focusing upon all permitted uses in
the M-1 zone, rather than the particular height of Burns' proposed building. Chairman Young's
perspective of zoning fits the classic definition of spot zoning-that is, zoning solely with respect
to the particular use in front of the governing board. Since building heights in excess of forty-five
(4 5) feet were expressly permitted as a conditional use in the M-1 zone, the ConLrnissioners should
have known foat by granting the rezone, they would open up that possibility, not only for Burns, but
anyone else in the zone. Burus' later CUP application was clearly consistent with that conditional
•!1
iJ
[!,...

use and there is certainly nothing insidious about Bums' follow-on CUP application, based on Burns'

r

desire to enhance environmental compatibility. Burns was merely pursuing exactly what it was
entitled to do under the Driggs CUP Ordinance.

1·

i
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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Dale
Storer
Holden, Kidwell, Ha.1-m &
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Kirk Burns
Concrete, L"'1.c.
2385 Gallatin Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

April 9, 2012
Dear Dale:
In accordance with Paragraph 2(b)(vi) of the Development Agreement for Burns Holding,
filed Teton County as Instrument# 191250 on September 5, 2007, the County is hereby
revoking Burns Holding's authority to operate
"Temporary Facility." Your client has until
July 1, 2012 to remove the temporary facility. If removal preparations are not commenced
15, 2012,
provide a written
for
a
for vv,.uu1vs,.vu
of the removal in keeping with the July 1, 2012 deadline.

Teton County Board of CoTu.'lty Commissioners

Kathryn Rinaldi, Chair

October 4, 2012

Dear Mr. Burns:
On April 9, 2012 the County sent you a written request to remove your "Temporary
by July 1, 2012. Nothing has been done to remove the facility as of the date of the
present letter. In accordance with Paragraph 2(b)(vi) of the Development Agreement for Bums
Holding, LLC filed in Teton County as Instrument# 191250 on September 5, 2007, the County
has revoked Burns Holding's authority to operate their
Facility." Please commence
removal activity immediately.

kimberlydevans@hotrnail.com
Plaintiffs/ Counterdefendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO,

AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON

BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

Case No. CV-2013-165

Plaintiffsf Counterdefendants,
vs.
TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of
State of Idaho,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
) ss.
)

I, KIRK BURNS, being duly swom~pon oath, depose and state as follows:
I am the manager of Burns Holdings, LLC and the president of Burns Concrete,

1.

Inc., who are the plaintiffs in the above-captioned lawsuit.
2.

Within days after I signed the Developer's Agreement dated August 31, 2007

between Bums Holdings, LLC and Teton County (the "Agreement"), I met with Teton County's
planning and zoning, Kurt Hibbert, to determine whether any permit was necessary

4837-2994-2560.2

after my
installation

Hibbert,
on,

property

Exhibit "A" to the Agreement and the construction of the road and highway improvements
required under Paragraph 2.d(iv) of the
4.

greemem (the "Road and Highway

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a letter dated October

15, 2007 from my engineer establishing that all of the required (and bonded) road improvements
had been completed, which the City of Driggs countersigned on October 16, 2007. And attached
hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of a letter erroneously dated September 6, 2007,

release

the letter of credit Bums Concrete, Inc. posted to ensure proper completion of the

Road and Highway Improvements. Copies of both of these letters were received in the ordinary
course of business by Bums Concrete,
5.

and were ( and are) retained in

business records.

Moreover, substantially all, if not 100%, of the work described in Paragraph 3

above, together with the additional work described in Paragraph 19 of the complaint I verified
and caused to be filed in the above-captioned lawsuit, was completed prior to the November 15,
2007 hearing of the Teton County Board of County Commissioners, when they unexpectedly
voted to deny issuance of a conditional use permit for the construction of the "Permanent
Facility" required to be constructed pursuant to Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the Agreement.

2
4837-2994-2560.2

this

of November

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to

4837-2994-2560.2

to be

correct

method

below, and addressed to the following:
Kathy Spitzer
TETON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
89 N. Main St., Suite 5
Driggs,
83422
Facsimile: (208) 354.2994

483 7-2994-2560 .2

(vJU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(0facsimile

October 15, 2007

Teton County Pla..11...'1ing and Zoning Department
89N. Main
Driggs, ID 83422
RE: Burns Concrete Development, Project No. 07527 .00

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This letter is to certify to Teton County that t..he bonded for road improvements on Casper
Drive relating to the Burns Concrete Development have been constructed in general
accordance with the approved and pern:litted plans and per the City of Driggs specifications
and requirements.
At this time, we are requesting that the bond be released for this project.
Please call to discuss any questions you
Sincere]y,
JORGENSEN ASSOCIATES, P.C.

Margaret S. Gillentine, P.E.
cc: File

r
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The ~ity of Driggs agrees that

road 1m1:Jro·ven11eIJlts

~:;dtf:Md,kv-:::=:::=:=::====----ared Gunderson, City of Driggs Public Works Director

{)

East Littie Avenue · P.O. Box 584 •

constructed per Driggs

Date

--

PLANNING AND BUILDING DEPAR.'11'1ENT

~

\

September 6, 2007
Bank of Idaho
Jeffrey E. Jones
PO Box 1487

399 North Capital
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
RE: Letter of Credit #204

Dear Mr. Jones,
We have received a Stamped Engineers letter from Jorgensen Associates; PC stating that
the infrastructure for Burns Concrete has been completed. We are hereby requesting the
release of the letter of credit #204 for Burns Concrete.
This letter is to authorize this request.

Tr;:qou,

y~'4~
Jdie Lehmann
Deputy Planning Admlnistrator
Teton County, Idaho

89 !'·'forth ?vta[n Str!::et~ Suite 4 Drlggs IduhG~83422
{r"\" \., · 4 ') 50··, !
,- ·1 -'6 -, ... l10 1 ..;Y • ,_ .,.> pt tOn e
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// of;
0 3:(
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Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON

BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,
Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

Case No. CV-2013-165
MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO TETON
COUNTY'S MOTION
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision of
of Idaho,

I.

INCORPORATION OF PENDING MOTIONS

Plaintiffs Burns Holdings, LLC and Burns Concrete, Inc. (jointly, "Burns") filed on
August 11, 2014, both (a) their motion for partial summary judgment against Defendant Teton
County, Idaho ("Teton County"), and (b) their motion to file an amended reply to Teton
County's Counterciaim, for the purpose of pleading as additional affirmative defenses the
doctrines of quasi-estoppel and prevention of performance, among others.

Because of the

extensive overlap between the foregoing two motions and Teton County's own motion for
SU11unary judgment filed September 18, 20i4, and in order to avoid burdening the Court from
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO TETON COUNTY'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT4842-2112-7968.2

I

Complaint2

Counterclaim,3 and

Afifjidavit.4
and
':I
,

the additional affirmative defenses set forth in paragraphs 29-32 of Exhibit A to the motion.

The dispute before the Court relates to the interpretation of that certain Developer's
Agreement made by and between Bums Holdings, LLC and Teton County (the "Agreement")
dated August 31, 2007, which is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Complaint. Neither Burns nor
Teton County argues that

Agreement is ambiguous with respect to any of its relevant

provisions. See, e.g., County's Memorandum6 at 9 ("the only question is one of law regarding
the applicability of

force majeure clause."). Accordingly, notwithstanding Teton County's

lengthy argument concerning the change over time

the height of Burns' proposed concrete

batch plant, the pre-contract factual circumsta_nces are irrelevant to the Court's interpretation of
the force majeure clause in the Agreement. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc. v. Clear Springs Foods,

1

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed
August 11, 2014 ("Burns' MSJ Memorandum").
2 Verified Complaint for: (i) Declaratory Judgment, (ii) Breach of Contract and
Rescission, (iii) Unjust Enrichment, filed May 21, 2013 ("Complaint").

3

Answer and Counterclaim, filed June 11, 2013 ("Answer and Counterclaim").

4

Affidavit of Kimberly D. Evans Ross, filed August 11, 2014 ("Ross Affidavit").

5 Motion to

Amended Reply to Counterclaim, filed August 11, 2014 ("Motion to

Amend").
6

Memorandum

Support of Summary Judgment, filed September 18, 2014 ("County's

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO TETON COUNTY'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
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reason

submitted

County is

irrelevant to the resolution of this contract dispute, it clearly establishes that "everybody"
understood that the

construction of a 75' high building not later than

July 11, 2007--or 50+ days before execution of the Agreement-when the Agreement was
approved by the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission. See County's Memorandum Ex. G at
3, LL. 14-23. Indeed, the 75' height of the proposed building was expressly mentioned at least
15 times at that public hearing. See id. at p 4, L. 1; p. 8,
& 23; p. 19, LL. 1, 6 & 17; p. 20, LL. 3-4

p. 26,

8; p. l 0, LL. 11 & 14; p. 11, LL. l
13; and p. 28, L. 3. The implication that

the county was somehow hoodwinked by Burns into agreeing to its proposed
batch plant thus flies

the face of the evidentiary record submitted to

high concrete
Court by Teton

County.

III.

ADDITIONAL FACTS

In addition to those factual matters set forth in Part II

Burns ' MSJ Memorandum,

which have been incorporated by reference, the following factual matters are established by the
Affidavit of Kirk Burns ("Burns Ajf."), filed concurrently herewith.
l.

After the Agreement had been executed and shortly before the temporary concrete

batch plant (the "Temporary Facility") was delivered to the property described in Exhibit "A" of
the Agreement (the "Property"), Kirk Burns, in his capacity as the manager of

and the president of Burns Concrete,

met

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO TETON COUNTY'S MOTION
JUDGMENT-3
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Holdings,
director

PARTIAL SUMMARY

2.

Immediately

meeting,

the
improvements

required under Paragraph 2.d(iv) of the Agreement. Substantially all, if not 100%,

such work

additional work described in Paragraph 19 of the Complaint was completed prior to the
November 15, 2007 hearing of the Teton County Board of County Commissioners, when they
unexpectedly voted to deny Burns a conditional use permit to construct the 75' high building
depicted in Exhibit C to the Agreement (the "Permanent Facility"). Burns Alf ,r 3-5.
3.

At no time since the installation of the Temporary Facility on the Property has

been notified by any representative of Teton County that a .., . . . cuuc of
for

type is required

continued maintenance or use of the Temporary Facility on the Property. Burns Ajf ,I 6.

ARGUMENT
Teton County concludes its argument with the following summation:
Interpretation of a contract provision is a question of law
and thus is appropriate for summary judgment. The contract
provision at issue in this case is the force majeure clause. All
claims stem from Burns' mistaken belief that the force majeure
clause protects them from performing.

County's Memorandum 23.

Although Burns concurs with the first two sentences of Teton

County's foregoing summation, the final sentence is patently wrong. For as argued at length in

Burns' AfSJ Memorandum, Bums claims against Teton County are grounded not only in the

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO TETON COUNTY'S MOTION
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SUMMARY

affirmative
clause.
Nevertheless, Bums

and rebuts below the principal arguments made by Teton

in the same sequence as

in

's Memorandum.

A.
Because Burns Could Not Anticipate That Teton County \Vould Prevent
rns from Constructing
Permanent Facility1 Burns
Not Breached the Agreement.
The term "force majeure" is defined in the most current version of Black's Law
Dictionary to mean:
An event or effect that can be neither anticipated nor controlled;
esp., an unexpected event that prevents someone from doing or
something that he or she had agreed or officially
planned to do.
term includes both acts of nature (e.g., floods
and
and acts of people
LAW DICTIONARY

761 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). And as Bums and Teton

County concur, one of the legal questions now before the Court "is whether Bums' performance
be delayed by

force majeure clause found in Paragraph 2(b)(iv) of the Agreement."

County's lvfemorandum 9. In this regard, Teton County argues: "There are no material facts in

dispute, all decisions are well documented and the facts are clear. The only thing that is not clear

7

See Burns' MSJ Memorandum 15.

8 See

id. at l 6-17.

9See

at19-2l.
at

MEMORANDUVI IN OPPOSITION TO TETON COUNTY'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

a
quoted in Burns' MSJ Memorandum:
It is a general principle
contract
t.l-iat if one pa.rty to a
contract hinders, prevents or makes impossible performance by the
other party, the latter's failure to perform will be excused. This
general principle has been referred to as the doctrine of prevention.
Under the doctrine, a contracting party whose performance of its
promise is prevented by the other party is not obligated to peiform
and is excused from any further offer ofperformance. In tum, the
preventing party is not allowed to recover damages for the
resulting nonperformance or otherwise benefit from its own
wrongful acts. When a promisor prevents, hinders, or renders
impossible the occurrence of a condition precedent to its promise
to perform, or to the performance of a return promise, the promisor
is not relieved of the obligation to perform and may not legally
terminate the contract for nonperformance. Furthermore, the
promisor may not invoke the other party's nonperformance as a
defense when it is sued on t.he contract. In short, under the
doctrine of prevention, when a party to a contract causes the
failure of the performance of the obligation due, it cannot in any
way take advantage ofthat failure.

*

*

*

The principle that prevention by one party excuses performance by
the other applies to both the performance of a condition and of a
promise and may be laid down broadly as applying to every
contract. Whether interference by one party to a contract amounts
to prevention so as to excuse performance by the other party and
constitute a breach by the interfering party is a question of fact to
be decided by the jury under all of the proved facts and
circumstances.
*

*

*

The rationale underlying the prevention doctrine, pursuant to
which the nonperformance by one party to the contract is excused
when the other party to the contract hinders, prevents, or makes
impossible that performance, is two-fold. First, the doctrine is
based on the long-established principle of law that a party should
MEMORANDUM
JUDGMENT-6
4842-2112-7968.2
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promisor or
s liability depends, it cannot

Second, the principle of prevention is based on the implied
agreement of the parties to a contract to proceed in good faith and
cooperate in performing the contract in accordance with its
expressed intent a.11d, therefore, to refrain from committing any
intentional act or omission that would interfere with the other
party or prevent or make it impossible for the other party to
perform.
13 RICHARD

LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS§§ 39:3 & 39:6 (4th ed., updated May 2014)

(footnotes omitted; emphasis added). Accord 17A AM. JuR. 2d Contracts§ 686 (2004); l7B

CJ.S. Contracts§ 703 (2011).
Accordingly,

as held in Sullivan v. Bullock, 124 Idaho 738,
under Idaho

188-89

P.2d 184,
the act

preventing a party's performance is "unreasonable, in other words, outside the contemplation of

the parties as expressed in the contract.;' (Emphasis added.) The question therefore becomes
was executed on August 31, 2007, the parties contemplated

whether, at the time the

that Teton County would deny Burns the zoning approvals required to construct the 75'
Permanent Facility that was depicted on Exhibit C to the Agreement and incorporated into the
Il

Agreement i 2.b(iii): "Attached as
"B"-site Plan, and Exhibit
Building Elevations, and by this
incorporated herein arc plans for construction of
Developer's intended permanent
("Permanent Facility"). (Bolding in
italics
Il

MEMORANDUM
.JUDGMENT - 7
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Immediately upon execution of this Agreement,
Developer shall order and commence construction of the
installation of
Permai."1ent Facility
Permanent Facility.
shall be completed within eighteen (18) months of execution of
this Agreement by the County, subject to delays resulting from
weather, strikes, shortage of steel or manufacturing equipment or
other act of force majeure or action beyond Developer's
control.
(v) In order to facilitate and support the construction of the
Permanent Facility and to allow the Developer to expedite
commercial operations, the Developer shall erect and operate a
temporary concrete batch plant on site as shown in Exhibit
Site Plan and Exhibit "D."
Agreement

,,i 2.b(iv)-(v)

erect and operate

(holding in original; italics added). And because these contractual

Temporary Facility, rather than delaying or conditioning

performance until some later date or the occurrence of some future event, there can be no
legitimate question but that the parties contemplated on August 31, 2007 that Teton County
would promptly grant Bums

zoning approvals required to construct the

Although application of the doctrine of prevention is of itself a sufficient basis for the
denial of Teton County's motion, both the doctrine's application and the facts supporting its

12
the above-quoted provisions were not dispositive, there would then be a material
question of fact. See above quote from Williston and Sullivan, 124 Idaho at 743 n.2, 864 P.2d
at 189. However, Teton County has not submitted a scintilla of evidence supporting a finding
that the parties did not intend Bums to immediately commence construction of
Facility following execution of the Agreement. Nor could any such evidence

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO TETON COUNTY'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
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not apply to the
dispute.

facts

the

at

U.lU Cogeneration

V.

Board of Governors for Higher Education, 915 F.Supp. 1267 (D.R.I. 1996), was included in a
contract between

parties to the dispute, but the required zoning approval was denied by a

stranger to the contract, the Tovvn of South Kingston. Id. at 1286.
Or stated in the language used in determining the application of force majeure clauses,
while

parties to a contract may well anticipate that a local jurisdiction not bound by

contractual obligation to either party may decide not to issue a zoning approval, it was plainly
unanticipated by the parties here that Teton County would not promptly issue the zoning
approvals required for Burns to construct the

Facility depicted in the

unforseeability of Teton County's unexpected change of heart and denial of

The
CUP

application is particularly obvious because, as the county admits: "Burns applied for the CUP on
June 13, 2007--over two months before the Agreement was executed." County's Memorandum
13.

One final point of clarification. The question now before the Court has nothing to do
with whether Teton County had the legal right to deny Bums the zoning approvals needed to
construct the Perma11ent Facility.

Burns acknowledges that the county had this right.

The

question, rather, is whether Teton County had the right to enter into the Agreement, and thereby
require Bums to expend hundreds of thousands of dollars, including constructing public road and
highway improvements for the county's benefit, see Complaint ,i 19, and then, after denying

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSIT10N TO TETON COUNTY'S
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not allow local governments (nor

to conduct
is not

to

summary judgment on Count I of its Counterclaim for breach of contract.
B.
Burns
Temporary Facility Compiied vVith
Not Entitled to Declaratory Relief.

Teton County

With but the one exception discussed below, Count II of Teton County's Counterclaim
for declaratory judgment is dependent on this Court's entry of summary judgment on Count I of
the Counterclaim for breach of contract. See, e.g., County's Memorandum at 14 ("The delay in
performance is not excusable and thus the County may rezone the property."); at 19 ("The
County now requests a declaration from the Court that a reasonable time for performance has
passed and the County is free to move forward with its application to rezone the property."); at
20 ("If the Court determines that the force majeure clause is not applicable, than [sic] the
County's request that the Temporary Facility be removed is proper. 07). However, because for the
reasons just discussed Teton County is not entitled to summary judgment on

Counterclaim for

breach of contract, the arguments made at pages 14-20 of the County's Memorandum are
irrelevant.
For the first time since the Temporary Facility was installed on the Property over seven
years ago, 13 Teton County now asserts that "[t]he Temporary Facility violates the International
Building Code as

by

County and the Driggs Area of Impact height regulation."

13

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO TETON COUNTY'S
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if

thought
or

the

Driggs

Building
of Impact height

County

raised

these issues somewhere, somehow, sometime before filing the County's Memorandum. Indeed,
County was required to do so by the terms

the Agreement. See

Notice of Default shall specify the nature of the alleged default ... ").
Nevertheless, Teton County now asserts that the Temporary Facility is in violation of the
IBC because "Burns never applied for or received a building permit for the Temporary Facility."
County's .Memorandum 21. Teton County relies on the following provision of the IBC

its

argument:

105.1 Required: Any owner or authorized agent who intends to
or change
construct, enlarge, alter, repair, move,
occupancy of a building or structure, or to erect, install, enlarge,
alter, repair, remove, convert or replace any electrical, gas,
mechanical, or plumbing system, the installation of which is
regulated by this code, or to cause any such work to be done, shall
first make application to the building official and obtain the
required permit.
Id (emphasis added). Teton county's argument is therefore directly dependent on there being a

"required permit" for the Temporary Facility.15

14 See County's Memorandum at Ex. H (notice of revocation dated April 9, 2012) and at
I (notice of revocation dated October 4, 2012).

not to have obtained a
not
EMORANDlJM IN OPPOSITION TO TETON COUNTY'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
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permit with
but

and

zoning confirmed before the Temporary Facility was installed that no permit was required to be
for the installation
~

operation of the Temporary Facility on the Property. Burm Ajf

2. Or stated in a nutshell, there was no "required permit') for the installation of the Temporary

Facility that Burns failed to obtain before it was installed on the Property.
Finally, Burns makes two arguments with respect to Teton County's concluding
argument that the Temporary Facility violates the height limitation now contained in Driggs
Code 9-7E-6.
First,
application

County fails to submit either a copy of the referenced ordinance or support
connection with the Temporary Facility and the

are

situated in Teton County and not the City of Driggs. Second, even if the referenced ordinance
was established to be generally applicable to ihe Temporary Facility, the ordinance was not
adopted until June 15, 2010

nearly three years after

Temporary Facility had been

l6 See Exhibit
attached hereto. In the event the Court should elect to take judicial
of Driggs Code 9-7E-6, Bums requests that the Court also take judicial notice of its date
of enactment, as set forth on
attached exhibit and posted on the City of Driggs' website
and
20 l
Notice of adjudicative

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO TETON COUNTY'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SU1WMARY
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lS

not

on

II

..

V

Based on the points

authorities set forth above and in Burns' MSJ Memorandum,

Teton County's motion for summary judgment should be denied in its entirety, with partial
summary judgment instead being entered in Burns' favor, thereby leaving only the amount of
damages to which Burns is entitled for determination at trial.
I)

1zcl

DATED this .iL_ day of November 2014.

l 7 The applicable
concerning nonconforming uses is set forth in Kootenai County v.
Harriman-Sayler, 154 Idaho 13, 293 P.3d 637 (2013):

A nonconforming use is "a use of land which lawfolly existed prior to the
enactment of a zoning ordinance and which is maintained after the effective date
of the ordinance even though not in compliance with use restrictions." Baxter v.
City of Preston, 115 Idaho 607, 608-09, 768 P.2d 1340, 1341-42 (1989)
( emphasis added) (citing 6 Rohan, Zoning & Land Use Controls § 41.01 [1]
(1978)). It is a property-right protection based upon the state and federal due
process clauses. Id. (citing Glengary-Gamlin Protective Ass 'n v. Bird, 106 Idaho
84, 675 P.2d 344 (Ct. App. 1983); Boise City v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 789, 572 P.2d
892 (1977); 0 'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 202 P.2d 401 (1949)).
Often referred to as a "grandfather right/' a nonconforming use "simply protects
the owner from abrupt termination of what had been a lawful condition or activity
on the property ....
18,293
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correct

the foregoing
to be

by the method

addressed to the following:
Kathy Spitzer
TETON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
89 N. Main St, Suite 5
Driggs, ID 83422
Facsimile: (208) 354.2994

(v)'U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( )2vemight Mail
(''J Facsimile
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I

9-7E-5

9-7E-8

9-7E·5:

SETBACK REQUIREMENTS :

A.

Front Yard: The front yard setback shall be a minimum of twenty feet
(20') when a lot abuts, touches , adjoins, or is across the street from
a residential district; otherwise , no fro nt yard setback is req uired.

B.

Side Yards: T he side yard shall be a minimum of twenty feet (20')
when a lot abuts, touches, or adjoins a residential district; othe rwise,
no side yard setback is required.

C.

Rear Yard: The rear yard sha ll be a minimum of twenty feet (20')
when a fat abuts, touches, or adjoins a residentral district; otherwise,
no rear yard setback is required. (Ord. 281-07, 9-4-2007)

9-7E-6:

BUILDING HEIGHT:

A.

Maximum Height: Any building or structure or portion thereof
hereafter erected shall not exceed forty five feet (45'} in height
above grade, unless a height exception is granted by the planning
and zoning comm ission following the procedures in chapter 2, article
D of this title.

B.

Height Step Down: Buildings shall not exceed thirty five feet (35') in
height when located less than one hundred feet (100') from any
residenUai or neighborhood commercial zone, unless a height
exception is granted by the planning and zoning commission
following the procedu re s in chapter 2, article D of this title. Buildings
that are partially within one hundred feet (100') of a residential zone
shall step down in roof elevation (i.e., from 45 feet to 35 feet) to be
consistent with the thirty five foot (35') limit. (Ord. 315-10,
6-15-2010)

---->--

OFF STREET PARKING AND LOADIN G REQUIREMENTS :
Ali off street parking and loading shall be governed by chapter
4 of this title. (Ord. 281-07, 9-4-2007; amd. 201 O Code)
9-7E-7:

9-7E-8:

SIGNS: The erection of signs is regulated by title 8, chapter 2
of this code. (Ord. 281-07 , 9-4-2007)

June 2011

C ity of Driggs

E hibit

\

..~

date: 11/20/20
Time: 10:05 am
Judge: Dane Watkins Jr
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen
Plaintiffs Attorney Emily Evans Ross
Defendant's Attorney Kathy Spitzer

those present
those present

the courtroom

case
there was a defendant's reply, I don't think I got that
take the file back to Bonneville
court reporter; will record digitally
No objections
1010
begins
J=housekeeping matter - motion to amend reply to counterclaim
Would like to file that pleading so it is official
Summary Judgment - up for hearing today

of a contract

12
started before 2006 and culminated in motion to get new zoning for batch plant
Tried to work very closely with county and City of Driggs for location of plant
It was the county and the city that chose the location and Burns Concrete bought the
property they indicated
Wrong zoning
Development agreement not drafted at that time
Feb 2007 county discussed potential height of the building

reasons why BC needed a

foot tall building

was on board
It approved and recommend the CUP
also negotiated the terms of the development agreement
Specifically addresses

height of the 75 book building

Obligated to build a 75' building
Submitted at the same time
1017
Required immediate commencement other improvement
In November 2007 county denied

CUP

B

Position the tolling provision was triggered by the denial of the variance

1020
Essentially undoing everything benefitting BC
Straight up legal issue
is not able to build 75' building;

October 04, 2012 served notice not going to be able to build and told to remove temporary
building
plant
County's argument - doesn't apply
not what
County

contract says

height of the building is in BC control

! f they were in control of the height of the building, it would be built by now

had the city's approval when it was submitted to the County
The development agreement demanded BC build the building

1024
Three legal concepts
1

interpretation of the plain language

2

doctrine

prevention

3are

to

BC does not take the position the County is estopped from denying the CUP
Remedies available to the county
County should be estopped from Invoking the provision of the contract that allows it to
remove prior zoning
BC

county took position on 75' building when it obligated BC to build it

In denying, county changed its position

If it didn't want the building, it shouldn't have signed

agreement

aclions are unconscionable
no is possession of all improvements

1031
Tolling provision had begun tolling
was estopped from

to

change in zoning

County sends notices saying we are undoing this
The actions of the county are a material breach
the
When repudiation of a contract is so severe it destroys the purpose for which the contract
is made
Reliance damages
of infrastructure required to provide
remedies are

sent

5 years since batch plant was

was

09

12

in

I can go off of is the public hearing record
Don't know what conversations were had
Don't know the city or county chose the site
A lot of concern over the height of the building

of representation was wouldn't be over 40' high; no higher than
out there

hangars that are

Both parties knew no one could build a 75" tall building until a CUP was granted
Height mentioned in exhibit in the back
Couldn't have made a variance
It is county jurisdiction
City P&Z recommended CUP be granted
1042
Improvements not required to be begun immediately
Immediately only used one time
Why did they put the improvements in before CUP granted
Should have gotten term immediately struck
1046
of contracting it was
1 zone

that they couldn't build a

tall building

was
county's position stayed steadfast
did

a development agreement

signing anything about a variance on the height; he didn't have that authorit"IJ
Signing of Development Agreement didn't even happen at a public meeting
They knew they needed that permission
m

up mind until after public hearing

1

is clear

we have prevented them from building their
the law

is by requiring them to comply

contemplated the CUP could have been denied
County never changed it's position
Denied CUP in November; first official act of the county on the height
County has not done anything to rescind the contract
We did go through a law suit for 5 years
Going under 2(b)(6)
had

denial was proper
is over 60

zoning

a building

Completely ignores the

that it signed

contract

? county has police power to control the zoning

Breach of a contract is a breach of a contract
Essentially buyer beware; you should know better than to rely on a contract
Not a land use issue; not a zoning issue; not a CUP issue
Contract addresses the height of the building
Buyer beware is unconscionable
took

when it

contract
was the

it

1102
in order to the construction
Not possible to comply with the provisions of the contract without a

1105
DA

clear not sure how we breached the contract

Contingent upon getting a CUP

1107
Will take the matter under advisement and issue a written decision
it wiil take the full 30 days

contract

IN

DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON

BURNS CONCRPTE, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

THE

Case No. CV-2013-165

ORDER
GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO
AMENDED
PLEADING

vs.
a political subdivision

The Motion to File Amended Reply to Counterclaim, filed August 11, 201
Concrete, Inc. and Bums Holdings,

of Plaintiffs'

Gointly, "Plaintiffs") having been duly noticed

and heard by the Court at hearing held November 20, 2014; and Defendar1t Teton County
("Defendant") having filed no opposition thereto nor otherwise having contested the grant of said
motion; and the Court being duly advised in the premises;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs are granted leave to file and serve on

aforesaid

SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of WC,,cxA(':¥\-.J~2014, I caused a true
and coITect copy of the foregoing [PROPOSED]
GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO FILE AMENDED PLEADING to be served by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:

Kimberly D. Evans Ross
1120 East 1275 North
Shelley, ID 83274
Facsimile: 208.357.0870

(~S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Kathy Spitzer
Teton County Prosecuting Attorney
89 N. Main Street, Suite 5
Driggs, ID 83422
354.2994

(ylli. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

)

)
)
)

)
)
)
)

vs.
TETON
a
of the State of Idaho,

)
)

Defendants.

)

I.
,~,,,,..,~, LLC 1 purchased property within Teton County with the intent of
building a concrete

plant on the purchased property.
limits, it

impact."

the

had previously agreed that areas

the property is located

the Driggs area

County and

impact would be subject to Driggs

zoning laws. In order to construct the concrete batch plant, Bums sought a zoning change for the
to

property from

(light industrial).

February 26, 2007, Teton County approved

requested zoning change subject to

several conditions, including that it and Bums enter a development agreement, which would
address concerns raised by the
applicable

the February 26, 2007 public hearing. The

ordinance for the property limited

height

buildings and structures to 45

feet.

two

are

to

and

to
the district court upheld

Following a petition
On appeal,

Idaho

county's denial of

the Teton County Commissioners,

was required to seek a zoning variance, rather than a CUP. The Court

holding that

reasoned that because, the

was not permitted to grant a waiver of the height limitations

county did not err

a

Following the

denying

CUP.

Court's decision,

the

structure.

County Board of County

4,

on
sent Burns a

revoking Bums' s authority to operate the temporary facility

demanding the facility's removal
then

1

property.

this

declaratory judgment, breach

contract and unjust enrichment. On August 11, 2014, Bums

filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the liability components of its three causes of

TetonCeunty filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on September 18, 2014.
Court
14.

on the two

summary judgment on

20,

1s no

if

party is entitled to

and
Grover v. Smith, 1
136 Idaho

P.3d 577 (2002).

Idaho
burden

46

as a matter

1105;

V.

at all times, on the moving party to

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Jordan v. Beek<;, 13 5 Idaho 5 86, 21
908 (200
Supreme Comi, in

Corp. v. Catrett, 477

317, 106 S.Ct.

summary judgment
bears the initial
court of the basis for its
and
portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,"
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. But unlike
the Court of Appeals, we find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that
the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials
negating the opponent's clai"m. On
contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to "the
affidavits, if any" (emphasis added), suggests the absence of such a requirement.
And if there were any doubt about the meaning of Rule 56( c) in this regard, such
doubt is clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b ), which provide the claimants and
defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment "with or without
supporting affidavits" (emphasis added). The import of these subsections is that,
summary judgment
regardless of whether the moving party accompanies
motion with
, and should, be granted so long as
is before
district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of
summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied. One of the principal
purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way
that allows it to accomplish this purpose.
at

, 106 S

at 2553 (alterations

original).
are to

noninferences

court to

v. Ratliff 134 Idaho

party.
Idaho 802, 10 P.3d

999 P.2d 892 (2000);

nonV.

l (Ct.

The Idaho appellate courts have followed the United States Supreme Court's decision in
which stated:
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are
designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action." ... Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only
the rights of
claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have
those claims and
tried to a jury, but also
defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided
claims and defenses have no factual basis.
at

106

137 Idaho 747,

A party

at

(citations omitted); see Win of Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc.,

Thomson v.

330

of Lewiston, 13 7 Idaho

50 P.3d 488

whom a summary judgment is sought cannot merely rest on his pleadings

but, when faced with affidavits or depositions supporting the motion, must come forward by way
of affidavit,
issues of fact,
136

admissions or other documentation to establish the existence of material
preclude the issuance of summary judgment. Anderson v. Hollingsworth,
P .3d 228 (2001 );

v. Craney, I

Idaho 166, 16 P

case,
mere

not

to create a

issue

263 (2000). The

1

to

at
cease to

to

Trailer Park v. Frede kind, 131 Idaho 634, 962 P.2d 1018, (1998).

facie case.

can be no

a situation,

issue of material

since a complete failure

such

proof

concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial. Id
trial court is not permitted to
the evidence or resolve
controverted factual issues when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. AID
v. Armstrong, 119 IdaJ10 897, 900, 811 P.2d 507, 510 (Ct.App.1991).
However, where the "evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather
a jury will be
trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite
of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible
conflict between those inferences." Riverside Development Co.
103 Idaho 515, 51 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982). See
Ins.
at 900, 811 P.2d at 510 (if the court will
the ultimate
of fact,
have moved for summary judgment and the motions are based on the
even though
same evidentiary facts, then "summary judgment
cont1icting inferences are possible, so long as all the evidence is confined entirely
91, 92
to
record"); Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469, 470,
judge will be the trier of fact, he or she is
to arrive
1985)
at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary

Small v.

1

Idaho

Sorensen, 13 Idaho

, 334,971 P.2d 1151, 1158 (Ct.
539,989 P.2d

1998); accord Drew v.

1 (1999).

to award attorney fees is left to the discretion
, l

Idaho 73,

court.
1

for so
in Paragraph
the Agreement ... has been
period
tolled until Teton County has taken all such action within its control as is ui:;1cc::o,::,a1.v
to permit Burns's construction of the Pennanent Facility ... "
in Support of Ps'

for Partial Sun1n1. J. at 21.

1.

The Agreement between Burns and Teton County provides:
2.
sole use allowed and restrictions
pursuant to this conditional rezone as reflected in this Agreement are as
a.
The property shall be used exclusively
mix concrete manufacturing facility.

the operation

a ready-

the current time
property
as described
paragraph l.
recommendation was based upon execution of this development
responsibilities and obligations pertaining to certain matters relating to
improvement and
of the property. This development and operation
shall
subject to
following terms and
in addition to
other
tenns hereof:

(ii)
All operations on the property shall comply with all
applicable and governing local, state or U.S. ordinances and Jaws relating to dust,
noise, water quality and air quality.

(iii)
as
plan, and
"C" Elevations, and by this reference incorporated herein are plans for
construction of Developer's intended permanent facility ("Permanent Facility").
Immediately upon execution of this Agreement, Developer
commence construction
the Permanent Facility.
The
(1
the Permanent Facility shall
completed within
to

(iv)

it

Temporary
is to allow Developer to
Developer's
the Pennanent Facility is constructed. The authority to operate
Temporary
Permanent Facility even if sooner
Facility shall tenninate upon completion of
than the described eighteen (18) month
period.

5.
The execution of this Agreement shall be
deemed written consent by Developer to change the zoning of the subject property
to its prior designation upon failure to comply with the conditions imposed by this
Agreement. No reversion shall take place until after a hearing on this matter
Upon notice and hearing, as provided in this
pursuant to Idaho Code §67-6511
Agreement and in Idaho Code §67-6509, if the property described in attached
Exhibit
is not used as approved, or if the approved use ends or is abandoned,
the Board of county Commissioners may, upon receiving a recommendation from
-,,,.,,,... board, order that the property will revert to
zoning
designation (and land uses allowed by that zoning designation)
prior to the rezone
1.e.,
revert
C3, Service and Highway
zonmg designation.

In the event of a default or breach of this
Ag:rec~mi;:m or of any of
terms or conditions, the party alleging default shall
give the breaching party not less than thirty (30) days Notice of Default, in
\vriting, u..rtless an emergency exists threatening the health and safety of the
public. If such an emergency exists, written notice shall be given in a reasonable
time and manner in light of the circumstances of the breach. The time of the
giving of the notice shall be measured from the date of the written Notice of
Default. The Notice of Default
specify the nature the
and,
where appropriate, the manner and period of time during which said default may
be satisfactorily cured. During any period of curing, the party charged shall not be
considered in default for the purposes of termination or zoning reversion, or the
institution of legal proceedings. the default is cured, then no default shall exist
charging
shall take no further action.
8.

1

to comply with all
to

at

\\Then interpreting a contract, this Court begins vvith the
language. In the absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in
its plain, ordinary and proper sense, according to the meaning derived
from the plain wording of the instrument. Interpreting an unambiguous
contract and determining whether there has been a violation of that
contract is an issue of law subject to free review. A contract tenn is
ambiguous when there are two different reasonable interpretations or the
is nonsensical. Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of
an ambiguous term is an issue of fact.
226 P.3d 1277, 1280

10) (internal citations and quotations

139 Idaho 770,
a
to be unambiguous
effect must be decided by the district court as a
it is only when that instrument is found to be ambiguous that
matter of
evidence as to
meaning of that
may be submitted to the finder of
fact. Id "[E]vidence
custom or
may not be introduced to
or
contradict
terms
a plain and unambiguous contract.. .. " Id at 773, 86 P.3d at
omitted}

Knipe Land Companyv. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449,259 P.3d 595 (2011).
Both parties agree that the Agreement is not ambiguous.

Bums

that the fundamental question at issue in this case is whether Section

2.b.(iv) of the Agreement excuses
within the 18 months

for failing to complete construction of the
arose

s

to obtain a

construct a building
or zonmg

does not qualify as a

The Idaho appellate courts have not addressed the issue
zoning approval may constitute a force

eure.

maJeure.

whether the failure to obtain

URI

Partners, L.P. v. Bd. of

Governors for Higher Education, 915 F.Supp. 1267 (D. R.L 1996), however, the United States

District Court for the District ofRJ1ode Island addressed the issue of whether plaintiffs inability
to secure an

contract's

rnajeure clause. The pertinent contractual language

URI

As used in
Agreement, "Force Majeure" means causes
reasonable
control of
without the fault or negligence of the party claiming
unabie to carry out any of
obligations under
Majeure. If either Party shall
this Agreement due to events beyond the reasonable controi
and without the
or negligence of the party claiming Force Majeure-including, but not
limited to an act of God; sabotage; accidents; appropriation or diversion
steam
energy, equipment, materials or commodities by rule or order
any
governmental or judicial authority having jurisdiction thereof; any changes in
applicable laws or regulations affecting performance; war; blockage; insurrection;
riot; labor dispute; labor or material shortage; fuel storage; fire; explosion; flood;
nuclear emergency; epidemic; landslide; lightning; earthquake or similar
catastrophic occurrence-this Agreement shall remain in effect, but the affected
Party's obligations shall be suspended for the period the affected Party is unable to
perform because of the disabling circumstances ...
at 1276.

21 does not excuse
5.2(d).
case
provides
guidance in analyzing
is
the common law of excuse and force majeure is sufficiently clear that the
confident in predicting how the issue would be
by
Rhode Island
Supreme Court.
The Court

Appeals of New York has written:

[C]ontractualforce majeure clauses--or clauses excusing nonperformance
due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties-under the
common law provide a ... narrow defense. Ordinarily, only if the force
clause specifically includes the event that actually prevents a
performance will that party be excused.
Kel
Corp. v. Central A1arkets, Inc., 70 N.Y.2d 900,
N.Y.S.2d 384, 385,
519 .E.2d
(1987) (citations omitted). Nowhere does ESA § 21
"failure to obtain zoning approval" anwng the parade of honibles triggering the
includes a catchall
section's application.
responds that ESA §
specifying that events
force majeure are
limited
the
calamities, and
"[c ]auses beyond
reasonable control of' (and
occurring without the fault of) UCP suffice.

In Kel Kim,
New York
Yvrote that "[t]he
interpretation applicable to [catchall] clauses is that the general words are not to
be given expansive meanfog; they are confined to things of the same kind or
nature as the particular matter mentioned.
N.Y.S.2d at 385-386, 519 .E.2d
at 296-297 (citing 18 Williston, Contracts § 1968, at 209 (3d ed. 1978)).
Applying the same canon of interpretation to the present matter, the Court
declines to extend ESA §
to cover zoning defeats.
What distinguishes the Biblical plagues described in
§ 21
a
to
procure zoning permission is the question of foreseeability. As the Board points
out, force mafeure clauses have traditionally applied to unforeseen
circumstances-typhoons, citizens run amok, Hannibal and his elephants at
result that the Court will extend
§ 21 only to those situations
that were demonstrably unforeseeable at the time of contracting.
specifically,
if
the Sout.h Kingstown Town Council were
September 1990 would the
majeure
A
S
1

two years
the contract was
parties bickered over whether South
jurisdiction, whether
approval was necessary for financing,
might seek
without the Board
historical
addition, after the
1990 community meeting, everyone knew that the
townsfolk were turning against the project and that environmental debates
loomed. Thus it was foreseeable that the South Kingstown Town Council would
prove less pliable than UCP hoped, that zoning approval would be denied, and
that the parties would have to cope with the consequences.
failure to win
zoning permission was a foreseeable event, unlike the catastrophes listed in
§ 21, and not of the nature and kind commonly excused by force majeure clauses.
UCP and the Board could have provided for this eventuality-instead,
left
everything UCP's hands.
Which raises the issue of who, under the ESA, bore the risk that zoning would be
denied. Under the common law, "if governmental approval is required for a
party's performance,
party may be taken to assume the risk that approval will
be denied if there is no provision excusing the party in that event." 2
Allan
(1
Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 9.6, at
omitted); see also 6 Corbin,
on Contracts, § 1347, at 435 (1962 &
Supp.1994) ("Ordinarily, when one contracts to render a
a
government license or permit is required, it is his duty to
the license or ~=-r~,.
so he can perform. The risk of inability to obtain it is on him; and its refusal by
the government is no defense in a suit for breach of his contract.") (footnotes
omitted); Security
Equipment Co. v. J\;fcFerren, 14 Ohio St.2d 251,
7
N.E.2d 898 (Ohio 1
(contractor bore risk that department of health would
reject plans for construction of sewage treatment plant). UCP undertook
chore
of obtaining financing; ESA § 42 expressly permitted UCP to seek
approval (and notify the Board) if the partnership decided that financing would be
unavailable without it. The decision was entirely UCP's-under ESA § 42(l)(ii),
the partnership could have notified the Board that "it is able to secure construction
for the system irrespective of any state or local law
or ordinance
zoning." It follows that UCP, having chosen to seek an
amendment to the zoning code, bore the risk that the South Kingstown Town
Council would refuse to make the change. UCP made performance of their
financing obligations contingent upon approval by the South Kingstown
authorities; hence, the hazard that approval would not
forthcoming, and that
performance would
impossible, was theirs.
H<~-u-.,u;-,

a matter
under
contract.

§ 21

or excuse

m
, should not
confined to things of the same
manufacturing equipment."

given expansive meaning, but

or nature as

shortage

steel or

was aware it would need approval for a CUP or zoning

variance prior to entering the agreement--consequently, the failure to procure the zoning
variance was foreseeable. Burns states that it could not have foreseen Teton County's denial
Burns applied for the CUP prior to the parties' execution
adds that Teton County implicitly

of the Agreement

Section 10 of

executed the Agreement

the 75-foot height when it

Agreement unambiguously

acknowledged that it cannot

to
Additionally, during

for a

standard

2007 public hearing, the Board of

County Commissioners expressed concerning regarding the plant facility
should

Bums

45

+~11
Lall.

foreseen that there was, at a minimum, a risk that its request for a CUP and/or

zoning variance could or would be denied. Bums and Teton County could have provided for the
eventuality that a zoning variance would not be obtained. They did not, thereby requiring Burns
to assume the ·

of not obtaining

Bums's failure to complete construction
months is not excused

the permanent facility within 18

Teton County's denial of the zoning variance.

the
. It notes that the

act
authority

Commissioners

caimot be influenced by app1ica._<1ts when applying zoning regulations.
parties rely on Sullivan v. Bullock, l

Idaho 738, 864 P.2d 184 (Ct. App. 1993). In

Sullivan, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated:

To excuse a party's nonperformance
conduct of the party preventing
performance must be "wTongful" and "in excess of their legal rights." 17A
Contracts § 468. Other authorities have stated that the conduct of the party
preventing performance must be outside what was permitted in the contract
when
"unjustified," or outside the reasonable contemplation of
contract was executed. Godburn v. Meserve, 130 Corm. 723, 37 A.2d
(1
Inc. v.
of Human Resources, 10 Kan.App.2d 197,
450 (1985);
Service and Installation Corp., v.
Education of the City of New York, 28 N.Y.2d 101, 320 N.Y.S.2d 46,268
(1971 ). Our Supreme Court has echoed this standard in Afolyneux [v.
Canal Co., 54 Idaho 619,
P.2d 651 (1934)], by stating:
at the time appellant [the canal company] ordered respondent
[A1olyneux ] to stop work, it intended to drill the tunnel
additional
length and then or later should proceed with the tunnel without having
previously in good faith and pursuant to the contract determined to
terminate the tunnel, it was obligated to let respondent do the work, and
it did not permit respondent to do such work appellant would, in such
case,
contract with respondent.
A.folynein:,

54 Idaho at 629,

P.2d at 655 (emphasis added).

Here, the trial court's instructions to the jury properly reflected this statement of
the law. . . . The issue of prevention was described
instruction twenty-two,
which follows the theory stated in
the act of prevention must have
contemplation
as
unreasonable, in
in
contract

an applicant must
variance is not

site

conflict with
not meet

acknowledges that it

§ 67-651

public interest."
of

67-6516 because the

without problematic site characteristics." Mem. in Support of

property

Bums

Summ. J. at 10, n. 4.

M. for Partial

Burns to comply with all
the language of Section 67-6516, the County

applicable
Commissioners could not

a

to

variance to the property in question, it was not
the zoning

actions in

and was not

the

contemplation as

as set forth in

on the

v. Blaine

County ex rel. Bd. Of Comm 'rs, 147 Idaho 193,207 P.3d 169 (2009).
Teton County responds

circumstances, which don't exist

Bums cannot satisfy

elements of quasi-estoppel. It

this case, must be established.
it has never barred the application

" it
to

1 A

1 -t

fell

proposed subdivision did not fall

the MOD. Relying on

to improve the

incurred great
affirmed the board

appeat the

s op1ruon,

Supreme Court

county commissioners, holding that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel was not

applicable to the case. The Court explained:
doctrine of quasi-estoppe]
when: (1) the offending
different position than his or her original position, and
either (a) the vu.~uuu.,;c:.
party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the
other party was induced to change positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to
permit the
party to maintain an
has already derived a benefit or acquiesced m.
81 186

Harrell [v.
of Lewiston,
Idaho
506 P
470 (1
we held that "[i]n the exercise
its police power, which includes the
enactment and enforcement of zoning regulations, a municipality acts in a
governmental capacity." [95 Idaho] at 248, 506 P.2d at 475.
further
stated that "[a]lthough a municipality may be estopped in limited
circumstances, the enactment of zoning regulations is a governmental
function which is not usually subject to estoppel." Id. at 247, 506 P.2d at
4 74. We determined in Harrell that no exigent reasons existed in that case
application
deciding what extraordinary
circumstances may merit the application of the doctrine of estoppel in
future cases. As in Harrell, we again determine that no exigent
circumstances exist in this case to apply estoppel against the City in the
of its police power.

at

P.2d at 748.

Most importantly, we are mindful of the precedential
decision
we are asked to make. Applicants would have this Court conclude that opinions
rendered by staff members effectively bind a board of county commissioners if
money is expended in reliance on those opinions. If this Court were to apply the
doctrine of estoppel in the instant case, then all future boards comm1ss1oners in
similar circumstances would be estopped from disagreeing with the opinions of
staff members simply because a landowner expended money in reliance on those
opinions. The effect would be to strip the boards of their sole statutory authority
to approve or deny subdivision applications, as provided by
§ 67-6504.
Accordingly, although we do not reject the proposition that estoppel may be
applied in appropriate circumstances, we do not find this to be an appropriate
circumstance.
, 207 P.3d at 1

at

to
s original position.
s originally approved of the
incorporated

C, which was

the

and

Zoning Commission unanimously

tall

a

facility.

C

a building elevation of 7 5 feet, Section 10 of the

Agreement states "Developer agrees to comply with all federal, state, county and local laws,
rules

which appertain to the subject property." The inclusion
not

building
10

cannot

Burns

cannot
by the
County

Commissioners.

Furthermore, even if

a position different than its original

position, Bums has not established any exigent circumstances that would vvarrant the application
quasi-estoppel in this case. Bums

that

expenditure of hundreds of thousands of

Agreement constitutes
it from

sufficient to estop Teton County

circumstances
a 75-foot tall facility.
is insufficient to create

as

Burns's
the

tolling

on

of the

permanent facility, should be denied.
on

of

Bums next asks for summary judgment, rescinding the Agreement. It argues that the
following

12

constitute a repudiation of
Burns remove the temporary
a

Agreement: (1) its October 4,

terms

18

that because

construct a
not

'""'",..,,u

to

County has

by demanding that Bums remove the temporary facility

and rezoning the property.
previously discussed,
by

months as

failed to construct the permanent facility within 18

5 of the Agreement, Teton County is

entitled to pursue a rezoning of

zoning designation. Because the

facility

18

is not in
contract.
Bums's motion

of contract

on
Bums next asks that

the Agreement is held to be void or voidable, that this Court grant

it summary judgment on its cause

enrichment.

Recovery cannot be had for unjust enrichment where there is an express contract
covering the same subject matter. Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 101 829
P.2d 1361, 1366 (Ct.App.1991).
reason for this
presently is that the
remedies for breach of an express
law or by
afford adequate relief"
Chem.
7 42 (9th Cir.1985).

contract
s claim

same

matter as at

Because the Agreement has not been

unjust

unenforceable, Bums may not

claim

m

to

unjust enrichment.

s motion for partial summary judgment on its claim for unjust enrichment should
denied.

I of

on

Teton

argues that

permanent facility
with

breached the

greemenr by failing to construct the
The issues raised by

18

to

on

are

Bums was required to construct the pem1anent

san1e as those addressed in

to do so is unexcused.

facility within 18 months.
Teton

I

be

judgment on

I of its Counterclaim

breach of contract.

Teton County's Motion

Teton County next seeks summary

on its Counterclaim for declaratory

which seeks:

9

are
I of the Counterclaim for breach

summary judgment on

J. at 1

Teton County's
judgment on its

on
contract."

entry of

m

to

Because Teton County is entitled to summary

contract counterclaim, it is likewise entitled to summary judgment on

tl:1:rough (d)

Count II of its counterclaim.

item (e), above, Teton County claims that it is entitled to summary judgment
uv,~,"'~"'v

Burns has not complied with all local laws and regulations, including
temporary

procurement

as required by the International Building Code,
facility exceeds the

Bums responds that

failure to

obtain a building permit or failure to
not

evidence

affidavit, Kirk Bums states that

International Building

with

It adds that

a building pennit was required. In

met with Kurt Hibbert, Teton County's director of planning

and ~~''""'- who indicated that a permit was not required for the temporary facility's
construction. Bums states that
pertaining to

County has not submitted a copy of the ordinance

limitation or indicated how

height inasmuch as the

is located in
June 15, 2010,

Driggs Code controls the temporary
County and not

Burns adds

appertain to
laws or
Developer to an enforcement action
jurisdiction.
to

lS

with all local laws, rnles and regulations under the

Although Teton County argues Teton County adopted the 2006 International
Code, Teton County has not cited which rule or regulation incorporates the IBC. In fact,

11

or Bums's failure to

a building pe1n1it
Bums

the temporary facility. Consequently,

Court will not rule on

IBC and local code
it

state the temporary

on the
1 zone." Answer and Counterclaim at 13, ,I 40. The
these

proceedings

the

have

height limit permitted in the

1 zone is 45 foet Bums knew at the time of its construction that the applicable height limit

the temporary facility was 45 feet. Although Teton County
temporary

that this Court hold the

since March 2009, this Court could not

find any evidence in record indicating when the temporary facility was constructed.
Consequently,

not make any finding as to the date of non-compliance.
motion for summary judgment seeking

judgment that the

§
to
1.
Idaho

§ 1 11

)

othenvise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a
state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, political subdivision
or the court
including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party
that the
reasonable attorney's
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it
nonprevailing party
without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
added).
Agreement

this case included Exhibit

which showed a proposed

m

to

Code§

117

§
121

the Idaho Code

In any civil action,
award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or
amend
statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The
term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person, partnership,
corporation,
the state of Idaho or political
subdivision thereof

J.R.C.P.

1) provides:

In any civil action the court may
reasonable attorney
which at the
include paralegal
to the prevailing
or
discretion of the court
Rule
provided
statute or
1 121, Idaho

§ 1
1 is not a matter
prevailing party,
is appropriate only when the
in
discretion, is
the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or defended
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
v. Afichalk,
Idaho
224,
5, 220 P.3d 580, 591 (2009) (citing AfcGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho
1,
562, 82 P.3d
844
While it is a close case, we decline to award
attorney fees as we are unable to conclude that this appeal was pursued
frivolously, unreasonably, or without merit.

Hoover v. Hunter, 150 Idaho 658,664,249 P.3d
Court cannot

that

1, 857 (2011) (emphasis added).

pursued and defended this action frivolously,

or without foundation.
to Idaho

party shall bring
the

to

§1

21 should

against the other

shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees

and costs."
Under the terms of the Agreement,

County is the prevailing party and entitled to

reasonable attorney fees and costs.
Teton County's motion

attorney fees pursuant to Section 12(e) of the Agreement

cause

s

lS

as
Agreement's force maj eure clause.

Bums's non-compliance is not

Agreement's force majeure clause does not prevent Teton County from rezoning
subject property or from enforcing its laws.
18-month period

to

1s in violation

construction

the permanent facility

County zoning
lS

removed.
and costs pursuant to Section 1

of

&

Box 51505
Idaho Falls, ID

PROSECUTING

230 North Main, Suite 125
ID83455

DISTRICT COURT OF THE

JUDICIAL DISTRICT

STATE

COlJNTY

IDAHO,

AND FOR

VS.

a political

Counterdefenda11ts Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings, LLC (jointly,
"Bums") deny

in the Counterclaim filed June 11, 2013, in

this civil action

Counterclaimant Teton County not expressly admitted hereinbelow.
COUNT I

L

In

to

1

Burns admits that Teton
affirmative

111

averments in

averments m

denies

3.

averments in paragraph 7
expressly required

as
"to erect and

defined Temporary Facility.
4.

Burns admits the averments in paragraphs 8 through 12 of the

Bums denies
was to

completed pursuant to

the

of the

(1

s

31.
m

.

.

rnmor errors m

substance of the
7.

Burns denies the averrnents in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Counterclaim.

8.

Burns admits the averments in paragraph 17 of the Counterclaim.

9.

Bums

10.

In response to paragraphs 19 and 20 of the Counterclaim, Bums denies it

attached the referenced Exhibit
averments

Burns

14 of

6.

the averment in paragraph 18 of the Counterclaim.

to the

admits the

states

to

12.

the averments in

13.

14.

no
the

admits the averments

Burns denies the averments in paragraphs

through 31

the

Counterclaim.

15.

to paragraph 32

16.

Burns hereby

averments in

17.

of

to

statement

quoted excerpt from

modifies

terms

the "subject

letter accurately sets
contained in

or

2.

Developer's
18.

In response to paragraph 35

the Counterclaim, Burns admits that a force

majeure clause protects a party to a contract if an obligation cannot be performed due to causes
that are specified within

of the paiiicular clause, such as in the particular dispute

"delays resulting from ... action beyond Developer's [i.e., Burns'] control."

19.

In response to paragraph
concerns

the Counterclaim, Burns denies the
111

hearmg.

sets

3

2
averment states a
to
states Idaho

§

1 l(d).

averments in paragraph 40

, \Vhich

any height limitation applies to the
not

the Counterclaim,
equipment

building or

In

to paragraph 41

two

the Counterclaim, Burns

that one of

the Developer's
defined Permanent
to
42
terms of Paragraph 5 of

full

sets forth

paragraph applies

s

subject to, Burns'

to

conditions

45

26.

Burns denies the averments in paragraphs 43

27.

The Counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

the

Counterclaim.

28.

amounts

Burns in this

action.

Bums are subject to

based on

by

on
on file in this

Teton

s

111

IS

equitable

31.

Based on

grounds,

others, pleaded

Burns in its Verified

Teton County's Counterclaim is barred

Complaint on file in this

the doctrine of

performance.
on those grounds, among
on file in this

"..,
.) .) .

to

Teton

pleaded

Burns in its Verified

s Counterclaim is

the doctrine of

filed the

Burns has brought this suit, and
is therefore entitled under

the Developer's Agreement.
its

attorney

of

and costs.

WHEREFORE, Burns prays for judgment on the Counterclaim as follows:
1.

for judgment that the counterclaims against Bums be dismissed and

County take nothing thereby;
an award of all costs
incurred

and
and

including

DATED this

Rt.'PT.V TO

~

day of December, 2014.

COUNTERCLAIM- 6

Client 29246 55.2

CERTIFICATE OF SEf VICE
1

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _!_~ay of December, 2014, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM to be served
by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
(X) U.S . Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Kathy Spitzer
TETON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

89 N. Main St. , Suite 5
Driggs, ID 83422
Facsimile (208) 354-2994
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IN

DISTRJCT COURT
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON

BURNS CONCRETE, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
vs.

Case No. CV-2013-165
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
RECONSIDERATION
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TETON COUNTY, a

Plaintiffs Burns Concrete,

and

pursuant to Rule l l(a)(2)(B), Idaho Rules

move

(jointly,

Procedure,

Court's reconsideration of

its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment, filed December 19,
2014, and the modification thereof so as to deny Teton County's Motion for summary judgment

in the
This motion is based on (i) Burns' supporting memorandum being filed concurrently
herewith, (ii) Bums' Verified Complaint filed May 21, 201
Counterclaim filed June 11, 2013, (iv) the
and

Amended

to

(iii) Teton County's
D. Evans

and

filed August 11,

TETON COUNTY
Main St., Suite 5
Driggs, ID 83422
(208) 354.2994

ATTORNEY

U Mail, Postage
( ) Hand Deiivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

1/

1

B

0

0

1"

0 \

COURT
STATE OF IDAHO,
CONCRETE, 1NC., an Idaho
corporation,
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC,
an Idaho

Habilit'f company,

vs.

Coonty.

("'Teton

argmnents in its opposition to the motion by Plaintiffs

Holdings,

LLC (jointly, ..Burns") requesting
Summary

-1
2 l-ll I3J}0 I'MJS l -3394-2052. vI

/01

08

1/ 0

3

8

14] 003/0

wording between those
include
findings of

of

Ins.

Although I.R.C.P. 54(a) has

(2012);

99.100.

1,
was

MSJ

O

A

01

@004/013

constitute a final 100,gmienr.
February 12

l)ro{;ess rights

to

§ J;

1217.
nrr>l'...-tnrfil

not

statutes which do

r1""'"""'u c,:mt1:ac1:uru or
1355, 1358

155

Constitutional Law § 693
c1atlSCS are limitations on

o I :/20

O

A

0 5/01

File Amentt,ea

September 19,
2014;

""copied"

letter and

AX

0

11

008/013

1

it 'Was.

of the

264 of

(1981), as
1985).

1-,u,,u,...

V.

Hodgson.

(SECOND) OF

706 P.2d 1363

App.

mets or

~'.iiU:,I:;

relevant

/0

007/0

8

A

aoe::erice of oirc:umstances showine: either a t.'"iml.nrr)'
h1i..c;m lu11 ur cunu1ouung 1auu on tne
of the

the duty. [Citations

But

vcrtormance of
contract is not an excuse if the cm:un1Stlme1:s
formation of
as to indicate that the possibility
it was
promiser.

A p~

"V'V'D-,"'§

~~h1-,,-,.a'li..:::....1,.

uwu

l.."'J'""""lf'"','""~!t:i,.

le.

'll"lf~

I1Vt.

¥-fl"CV~ ..

wntcn proviaea !Or me

surrounding
the vvarchou;:,c diJ uvl
-~-

--a-L....--3!.

th~ tenant oould

on

use
refusal to

X

1
,!'

0

O

had applied for
(i)

cannot

an
to

In
a state law ... is void.'"

states

Teton County
the time

as

are in

2I813.001'4851-3)'94-2052. vl

01

008/0
A

8 01 /

801

statement

is

1119,

V.

to excuse
or is no
a third party.''

impossibility

of the

is

to those

occurrence

act

now

Thus, as

comments to

§

OF

261 was
it, states a
in § 261.

basic

lS

a
or
governmental regwat:ion or
regulation or
non-occurrence of which was a basic
on which the contract was
exrnatnea in the comments to Section 264:

Nature of regulation or order. Under the rule
regulation or
may be domestic or
It
level

and
be, for
an ru.tn1tmstrnUve =...,,.,_., .. _
and technical ,.,...,,,u4.,,,,,..,,,~

PV'>mHl'3

like are disregarded.

but a
Section must
imposed by §
§
2!81'.Hl0!\4851•:3394-205::tvi

Cint. b,

"

1 .0

[fl]010/0

01

/l.

§ 264, cmt a \ vU>b'J'AMa.;,'-> - - • ~ - · , .

County's
a variance at

than

oec:nol:is 264 and 261 as

;:i.ecnon 266(1 ):

21813.00i'MISl-33~.,2_111

.,,.,.,...........t

Bums to

means

266(1>1

And as

comments to

o

o I o1

O FAX

01

O 3 811

to

only fails to

D.

County has repeatedly

to

Plaintiffs

complied with
with a 45-foot

Teton County

75-foot plant.

Teton County
impossibility"

a 45-foot concrete

4

U is

of a concrete
11, 2013~

116.

0

0

lg]O

A

not

to

set

1st

201

oss
r Pla.intiffivCounterdefendants

i01

o I

01

0

0 FAX

Driggs, ID 83422
Fac!:imille: (208) 354.2994

(
(
(

)
)
)
)

/01

date:
Time: 1:38 pm
Judge: Dane Watkins Jr
Minutes Clerk: Phyllis Hansen
Attorney Kimberly

Ross

Defendant's Attorney Kathy Spitzer

l calls case; ids
court reporter
- no objection
- no objections

J have received three
limits of motion

opposition

Court entered Memo
As drafted and filed did not comply with Final Judgment
Burns did not take that as final order

54 - made some concessions for
Application was a complete denial of due process
We believe the motion is
Raises affirmative
want court to

appeal

Appears Burns was able to comply with the CUP whereas the variance was not applicable
at all

.

266 1 of

restatement

145

was not

fault

was

to court

to

~~+-

11VL

It was a Memorandum
Pretty

and Order

if

rest

is

Was it a basic assumption the height of the building would be
Foreseeability that the

feet

could be denied

commissioners expressed sever concern about the height of the building
They talked to prior

about concerns

155
county was
not

one
out

or

2 -if

contract is not

it is not
is not

J will

itis

one that was in control of

matter under advisement

)

)
)
J

)
)
)
)

vs.

)
)
)
)

of the

I.

building a concrete

it

had previously

within

that areas within the
to construct

to

concrete

(commercial) to svI-1

a

On

26, 2007,

approved the requested zoning change subject to several conditions, including that

it

enter a development agreement.
height

structures to

feet Burns wished to built a 75-foot structwe on the property.

Driggs

zoning ordinance provided, "[a]ny building or structure or portion thereof hereafter erected shall

-l

a

2007, a hearing was
to deny

Follo'\'.'r1ng a

court upheld

the COP. On appeal, the Idaho

""~"·=~,~

Court affirmed

Teton County .._,._,,.=.,a00Luu,.-1

a zoning

holding that

county was not

,,,,,LLUH,V~

not err

denial

than a

The Court

to grant a waiver of the

limitations

CUP.

structure. Teton

on :SeJ)ternb<:r 13, 2012. On
a letter revoking Bu:ms's

Board

County

to operate the To-W,nA~n

and demanding the facility's removal from the property.
Bu..us th.en filed this action against
declaratory

contract and unjust

On August 11, 2014, Burns

filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgn1ent on the liability components of its three causes of
action.
Teton County

a Motion

on September 18,

RECONSIDERATION 2

to

(d)

temporary facility is in violation of Teton County zoning
County's revocation of the temporary
facility must be removed.

19,

Mem.

On December

is effective and

at

2014, Bums

on

Decision

Order

Reconsideration on

19,

On June 1, 2015, Burns filed a Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion

Reconsideration.
Court held

2

Although

Amended

on

reconsideration on June 4, 2015.

to Counterclaim was not filed until after this Court,,.,.,._,,.."''"'

Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment, the motion to

19,

the motion to amend (December

FOR RECONSIDER...\ TION •

20

v. Petrovich1 153

l

1

motion for summary judgment
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

genume
law."

56(c).

v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105; Rockefeller v.

Grabow, 136 Ida.ho 637,

is, at all times, on the

party to

V.

P.3d

The United

m

V.

317,

986),
Of comse, a
seeking summary judgment alv,1ays bears the initial
infonning the district court
the basis
its motion,
responsibility
identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on :file, together with the affidavits, if any," which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. But unlike
Court of Appeals, we find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that
the moving
mth affidavits or other similar materials
negating the opponent's claim. On the contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to
affidavits, if any'' (emphasis added), suggests the absence of such a requirement.
And if there were any doubt about
meaning of Rule 56(c) in tbis regard, such
doubt is clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide the claimants and
defendants) respectively, may move for summary judgment "-with or without
supporting affidavits"
added).
these subsections is that,
regardless of whether tl1,e

party accompanies its

,.i

at

are to

54

137

judgment, a

court is not permitted to

Lott,

Idaho 846, 993

609 (2000). Liberal construction of the facts

the court to draw

party

party. Farnworth v.

802, 10

the evidence to

134

favor of the nonnon-

U1

999 P.2d 892 (2000);

v. Roth, I

1 (Ct.

Su.T,.rmuy

is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural

. . ~....,,~,,. but rather as an
of the Federal Rules as a whole,
designed
secure
just, speedy .and inexpensive determination
action." ..
56 must
construed with du.e
not on1y for
rights of
persons asserting
and defenses that are adequately
to
Those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the
persons
opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in
manner provided by the
Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.

at

see Win ofMichigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc.,

at

137 Idaho 747, 53 P.3d 330 (2002); Thomson v. City ofLewiston, 1

a summary

473,

cannot merely rest on

P.3d 488

a
1/,

220 (2001).

, 136 ldaho

is entitled to Judgment

movmg

to

at trial. Primary Health Nenvork, Inc. v. State, Dept. ofAdmin.,

Facts

cease to

"material"

when

Idaho

a

P.3d 307

plaintiff foils to establish a prima

case. Post Falls Trailer Park v. Frede kind, 131 Idaho 634,

1018, (1998).

In such

of proof

immaterial Id
trial court is not permitted to
the
or resolve
controverted factual
when ruling on a motion for
judgment. AID
Ins.
v. Armstrong, 119 Idaho 897, 900, 811 P.2d 507, 510 (Ct.App.1991).
However,
the "evidentiary facts are not disputed
the
court
than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the
possibility
conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible
for resolving the conflict between those inferences." Riverside Development Co.
v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982). See also AID Ins. Co.,
119 Idaho at 900, 811 P .2d at 510 (if the court will be
ultimate finder of fact,
both parties have moved for summary judgment and the motions are based on the
same evidentiary facts, then "summary judgment is appropriate even though
conflicting inferences are possible, so long as all the evidence is confined entirely
to the
Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469, 470, 700 P.2d 91, 92
(Ct.App.1985) (when the judge will be the
fact,
to arrive
at the most probable
to be
evidentiary
facts).

State,

Idaho

p

5

11

V,

1

Court to

irn.possibility doctrine, as plead in

excuses

_n,,,'i"'l'n,""""''"' 1' " '

Amended Reply to Counterclaim,

and Sw"'Tlillary judgment should no't:

responds

is untimely

have been granted to

that the doctrine of

Comity

argues
judgment because it resolved all

in this case. It argues triat Rule l l(a)(2){B) only

allows for reconsideration of interlocutory orders

Bums, therefore, should

filed a Rule

to
for reconsideration because it was filed more than

days

entry of the December

19,

suit, adjudicates
deteITI1ination

FOR

rig._hts.

7

at
time
the
not
( 14) days after the entry of
for reconsideration of
of the
court made after
final judgment may be
(14)
from fue entry of such order; provided, there shall
no
motion for reconsideration of an order of
trial court entered on any motion

under Rules 50(a), 52(b),

LR.C.P. 59(e) provides:

59(a),

59.1, 60(a), or 60(b).

motion to alter or amend the judgrnent

be

not

LR.C.P. 54(a)

means a separate document entitled
shall state the relief to which a party is
relief the action.
relief can include
entitled on one or more
dismissal \vith or v,rithout prejudice. A judgment
not
a
of
the
of a master,
record of prior proceedings,
lcr.v. A judgment 1s
legal reasoning, findings of fact, or conclusions
"Judgment" as

"Judgment" or "Decree". A

either it has been certified as final
to subsection fo)(l) of this
or
judgment has been entered on all claims for relief, except costs and
asserted
by or against all
in the action_ A judgment sh.all begin v;ith
words

"JTJDG,MENT IS ENTEP...ED AS FOLLOWS: .. , "

it shall not contain any

other wording between
words and the caption.
findings of fact or conclusions
law expressly
regulation.

judgment ca_n include any
by
or

added).

2015,

Idaho Supreme Court entered an Order . . u,,~"~'=

Re: Finality

ofJudgments Entered Prior to April 15, 20]5_ The Order states:
\VHEREAS there are a number of judgments that

been previously entered
Rule of
that do not comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) or
Law Procedure

-8

a

Memorandu111 Decision

did this

December 19,

to

Order was an interlocutory

Court has not yet entered judgment Consequently,
for reconsideration and

and l'fiis

does not

motion is timely under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B).

Teton County also argues that

motion

in ai.1 amended
Memorandum

explains that it never had
was never

opportunity to

a

proposed
Bums replies

of the August 11,
memorandum

4

support thereof,

to

to Counterclaim and the

Amended

September 19, 2014 Notice of Hearing Re: Motion to File

lunended Reply to Counterclaim, and the December

2014 Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion

to File Amended Pleading.

November 20, 2014 at which
Court minutes from

this Court stated it would

Bums's motion to amend.

2014, court hearing indicate that both

and

the motion to

Teton
the

was

FOR RECONSIDERATION·

not

to

Counterclaim_

Burns

at

time the

Court would hold, as it did in Bums Holdings, LLC 11. Teton County Bd. of
Com

152 Idaho 440,272 P.3d 412

that the Driggs zoning ordinance (Driggs, Idaho,

§ 13(c)), which prohibited structures from exceeding 45

was obtained, was void

§ 67-65

of the Local

in height unless a

Use Planning

contract

Teton County responds that

impossibility doctrine

not apply to this case because

was always aware

cites Johnson v.

a height

County, 146 Idaho 916,

204 PJd 1127, 1136

(2009) and Arthur v. Shoshone Co., 133 Idaho 854, 993 P.2d 617 (Ct. App_ 2000), for
proposition that a conflict between the LL UPA

a local ordinance does not implicate the

impossibility a.oc:trn:Le.

In Sutheimer v_ Stoltenberg, 127 Idaho 81, 85, 896 P.2d 989, 993 (1995), the Idaho Court
of Appeals explained the application. of the doctrine of impossibility:

Haessly

v_

Safeco Title

1121 (1992), the Idaho

Idaho 463, 465, 825 P.2d 1119,
that the doctrine of impossibility

bargained-for performance is no
to

10

1

Idaho Court

or

where anew

creates an

Landis involved a
balance

the State

on a contract

the sale of a

Idaho. The State had

the property to

predecessors for many

judge ruled that

which

State's decision not to reuew a

on

property

for the purchaser to fulfill the contract.

cte1errrunrng whether

non~occurrence
a
event was a
a
will look at all the circUcrnstances, including the
of the
contract.
fact that the
was unforeseeable is significant in suggesting
non-occurrence v>1as a basic assumption.
the
event was not
reasonably foreseeable when the contract was made,
party claiming v..,...,,,~,=
hardly be
to
provided against its occurrence. However, if it was
or even foreseen, the opposite conclusion does not
necessarily follow." RESTATEME1'.ff (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261,
comment (c) (1981).
such superseding event has been the government imposition of a new lcnv,
or
which makes the performance of a duty impractical.
RESTATElvfENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
(1981).
perfonnai.1ce becomes impractical, i.e., if the order or regulation was an event the
non-occurrence of which was assumed at the time the contract was made, the
-Kat'"""' will be relieved of his duty to perfo1m. Where a contract is executed
involving a
which requires the permission of government officers, the fact
that such permission is not forthcoming
required has been held not to
17A C.J.S. COl'ffRACTS § 463(1)
v. Hotel Trinidad, 29 So.2d 696
1

1

~

11

was founded on
unconditionally,
the risk of

should become impossible by
circumstances beyond bis
unjust consequences of
general
ntle gave
to certain exceptions. One of these is that a contractual duty

is discharged where performance is subsequently prevented or prohibited
by a judicial, executive, or administrative order, in the absence of
circ:umstcmces showing either a contrary intention or contributing fault on
the part of the person subject to the duty. [Citations omitted.] But an order
which interferes with the performance of the contract is not an excuse if
the circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract are such as to
indicate that the possibility of such interference was recognized and the
risk of it was assumed by
pro mis or.
is cited as authority in Acme }.foving and Storage Corporation v. Bower,
478,306 A.2d 545 (1973). In Acme, a
agreement was
for
'"'"'-'"""''"'· The landlord had to obtain a
variance to
a totally
was
su.bj ect to ten
landscaping
0 , landscaping, parking and vehicular access.
submitted to the county pla..11!11ng board
however, it was not approved. The board promulgated
o,\fJJ plan which
provided
the removal of a chain-link fence and a sidewalk surrounding the
buildings. Without the fence
sidew:;ilk: i:he warehouse did not comply v.rith the
~~··=,-, law as a totally enclosed
and could not receive a use and
occupancy permit which was required in the lease. The Maryland Court of
Appeals held the tenant
not sue for specific perfonnance of the
No
fault was found on the part of
landlord in
to obtain the use and
occupancy permit. There was no suggestion that the refusal to issue the use and
occupancy permit was foreseeable or that the landlord assumed the risk
such
refusal. Therefore, the defense of :impossibility of performance was properly
available to him.
i v k ~ ~ ~ ... ,

Here we b,ave a similar
The district court found that Hodgson was not at
fault, that he had maintained the hotel in good condition meeting the state
requirements. The district court allowed Hodgson to testify about his
understanding of the lease agreement with the state. He testified he thought the
would be continued indefinitely based on the longevity the hotel
assurances by the superintendent
the Heyburn
not cancel the lease ....

at

706

at

1

Id~ho
state regulation

the
§ 67-6516, which was in existence at

Idaho

time the parties executed the

states:

is a modification of the bulk and placement requirements
the
,..=,uu--- as to lot: size, lot coverage, width, depth, front yard,
yard, rear
.~~-,,~~- parking space, height of buildings, or other ordinance provision
the size or shape of a structure or the placement of the structure upon
or
of lots. A variance shdll not be considered a right or special
.,,u,..u..t._,...,

privilege, but may be granted to an applicant
hardship
of characteristics
the
conflict with the
interest.
the Supreme

has explained, a CUP

of undue
is not in

not allow

variances

A CUP concerns the proposed use of property, not the
requirements such as
height of buildings. Idaho
6512(a) provides:
special use permit may be granted to an applicant if
conditionally permitted by the terms of the
conditions pursuant to specific provisions
the
to
ability of political subdivisions, including school districts, to provide
services for the proposed use, and when it is not in conflict with the plan.

In addition,
proposed use must be prescribed wit.1nn the zoning ordinance.
Gardiner, 148 Idaho at 767, 229 P.3d at
"If the ordinance does not
a proposed use, it is not eligible for a conditional/special use
229 P.3d at 373.
waiver of a
ordinance

13

a

10.
Developer agrees to comply with all
county and local laws, rules and regulations, which appertain to
property. Developer's failure to comply with
laws or
Agreement Vvill subject Developer to an enforcement action by
court of competent jurisdiction.

Section 10 of the Agreement indicates that the nc,rt,,,c contemplated possible :interference

of

state laws and that Burns

with construction

fact that compliance with

is no genuine

§ 67-6516 was reasonably

to

is inapplicable to the

of this case. Furthermore,

inability to construct

permanent facility was not caused by the Supreme

of a

limit on all stru.cttrres within

Driggs Area of

existed prior to the Agreement's execution. There is no genuine issue of material fact that

Bums' s inability to fulfill the Agreement was not caused by the "imposition

a new law,

regulation or order. Landis, 109 Idaho at 256, 706 P.2d at 1367.
Bums's motion for reconsideration, based on

both

costs.''

Under the terms of the Agreement, Teton County is

party

entitled to

reasonable attorney fees and costs.
Teton County's request for attorney

pursuant

Section 12(e) of the Agreement

should be granted_

County is entitled to <>T"l'r,,-,-,""'

t1ns Court need not

'-'V.LLJJ.U.Vk

motion

Section 12(e) of the Agreement,

whether Idaho

an

reconsideration is denied.

County's request for attorney

DATED this~"~ day of

1s

~ U[\~

2015.

-

ou~:y Pr

20

u or

t~ '

2

FIELDS, CHARTERED

Box 51505

Falls, ID 83405
Spitzer
TETON COUNTY PROSECUTING

230 North Main,
Driggs, ID 83455

125
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p

INC.,
anldahocorporation,and
HOLDINGS,
an
limited liability company,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
V.

COUNTY, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
The Court hereby enters judgment in favor ofDefendant/Counterclaimant Teton
County, Idaho, and against Plaintiffs/Counterdefendant Burns Concrete, Inc. and Bums
LLC, granting relief pursuant to the tenns of this Court's "·~--~0.~ nrn,,'""'
and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment entered on
be
Complaint in the above entitled action is hereby dismissed
deemed as a Final Judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(a).
00

IT

Boise,
Telephone:
562-4900
b bond@parsons behle. com

ntv1E: _____ _
TETOrJ CO. \D

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants
Burns Concrete, Inc. and Burns Holdings,

IN

DISTRICT COURT OF

SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF IDAHO,

COUNTY OF TETON

BURNS
an
corporation,
BUR.NS HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability

TETON COlJ1'-JTY, a political
of Idaho,

THE

No. CV-2013-165

of

Defendant/Counterclaimant/Respondent.

TO THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, TETON COUNTY, IDAHO, AND ITS
ATTORNEY:
Kathy Spitzer
Teton County Prosecuting
N. Main Street, Suite 5
Driggs, Idaho 83422

5,

to

a

described

3.

to the

is appealable

paragraph 1

and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l),

The appellants' preliminary statement of the issues on appeal is as follows:
a.

Did the district court err in ruling that the doctrine of impossibility
not

s Agreement

or

the appellants' obligation under the subject

the

concrete

described in

(the

court err
performance) did not

the

or discharge

(of
under

subject

Faciiity?
district court err

C.

ruling that the force majeure

in the

subject Developer's Agreement did not suspend the appellants' obligation under the subject
Developer's Agreement for the construction of the Permanent Facility?
Did

court err

breach the subject Developer's Agreement?
e.

not

Did

court err

ruling that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel

applied to estop the respondent from rezoning the appellants'

6.

to

together

a.

additional

automatically included under

Verified Complaint

11,

3.

11,

C.

d.

14.

Affidavit

e.

to

filed November 5,

f.

28(b )(1 ),

, 2013.

filed

b.

s

(i) Declaratory Judgment, (ii) Breach of Contract

filed May

and Rescission, (iii) Unjust

included in

Order

s

14.
to

Amended Pleading, filed

14.
g.

Amended

h.

Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration, filed

June 24, 2015.
7.

N/A

8.

I
a.

to Counterclaim, filed December 29, 2014.

1
e.

DATED

to

15.
LATIMER

Brook B. Bond
Attorneys
Appellants

to

Street, Ste. 5
Driggs, ID 83422
Facsimile
354-2994

Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight
(X) Facsimile

)
)
Appellants,

)

)
- vs -

)

COUNlY

NO.

CV 2013-165

)
TETON COUNlY, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho

)
)

Defendant/Counterclaimant/Respondent

)

OF EXHIBITS

)

I, Phyllis A. Hansen, Deputy Clerk

the District Court of the Seventh Judicial

District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Teton, do hereby certify that
there were NO

offered or admitted into evidence in this case.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto

my hand and affixed the seal

of
Mary Lou Hansen

)
)

)
- vs TETON COUNTY, a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho
Defendant/Counterclaimant/Respondent

)
)
)
)
)
)

COUNTY
CV 2013-165

NO.

OF

I, Phyllis A. Hansen, deputy clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial
District of the State of Idaho1 in and

do hereby

that I have

personally served or mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the
Clerk's Record

each of

Brook
Bond,
800 W. Main Street,
Boise, Idaho 83702

parties or

attorney of record as follows:

1300
Driggs, Idaho

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto

my hand and affixed the seal of the

Mary Lou Hansen

- vs COUNTY, a political subdivision
of Idaho

)
)
)
)
)
)

TETON COUNTY
CV 2013-165

NO.

)

)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

)
Defendant/Counterclaimant/Respondent

)

I, Phyllis A. Hansen, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Teton, do hereby certify that the
above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction

and is a true, full

28 of the Idaho Appellate

entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along
the Court Reporter's Transcripts and Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the
Idaho Appellate Rules.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the

Mary Lou Hansen

